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Why GSP?
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal (GSP) is the official
journal of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) and is published
by the University of Toronto Press through a partnership of the IAGS and the
International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (A Division of the
Zoryan Institute) (IIGHRS). The two organizations share a deep commitment to
the study and prevention of the genocide of all peoples.
GSP’s mission is to understand the phenomenon of genocide, create an awareness
of it as an ongoing scourge, and promote the necessity of preventing it, for both
pragmatic and moral reasons. The journal seeks to educate, inform, and encourage
new generations of scholars to conduct research on genocide and provide a forum
for those who wish to work toward preventing it. This interdisciplinary, peer-
reviewed journal will stress that genocide is a universal human experience; to that
end, it will publish scholarly articles and reviews on all aspects of genocide and will
welcome, in particular, comparative analyses and articles on the prevention of
genocide.
We feel a sense of urgency in a world where, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the
slogan ‘‘never again’’ was coined, yet since 1945 we have seen the mass slaughter of
Bengalis, Cambodians, Rwandans, Bosnians, Kosovars, and Darfuris, to name only a
few. During the same period, the destruction of indigenous peoples has been less
visible, but ongoing.
We believe strongly that research, analysis, education, and awareness are
necessary to help civil societies, governments, and policy makers understand the
consequences of the failure to prevent genocide and other gross violations of human
rights in a world in which, today, some 100 million people live outside their countries of
birth due to forced displacement.
We recognize that the promise of genocide prevention explicit in our title is very
ambitious. How do we prevent genocide from happening? No single step will change
the world, but we believe that through careful research and reasoned argument,
governments and policy makers can be persuaded to expand their concept of national
interest to include the prevention of genocide. We further believe that for governments
and policy makers to have the political will to enforce the international laws and
conventions on genocide through intervention and prevention, they must be held
accountable by their informed constituencies. It is through education and awareness
that people are made to understand their responsibility to hold their governments
accountable in this regard.
While awareness is a first step to the prevention of genocide, cognitive awareness
is not enough. In our ever-shrinking world, where there is ever-increasing competition
for land and the basic resources for life, the conditions for violent conflict are ever
greater. We feel that the key failure of human society has been the failure to adopt life
itself as the central value of all human decision making.
Our journal will strive to generate innovative research on all aspects of the causes,
dynamics, outcomes, and colossal consequences and implications of the policies we
adopt regarding the choices between preserving and harming human life.
Genocide is a man-made catastrophe, and, as such, it can be prevented by
mankind. This journal sets its sights on new ideas for the prevention of genocidal
death-making. Genocide Studies and Prevention will be particularly open to
contributions that go beyond safe, approved, and established paradigms of scholarship
and science. It will be open to the unusual, the daring, and the courageous. At the same
time, such thinking needs to be anchored responsibly to the norms and safeguards of
established academic and scientific disciplines. We hope this journal will provide an
effective forum for creative thinking on all aspects of genocide studies, serve to raise
awareness of genocide, and promote the prevention of genocide with ideas that are
both visionary and practical.
Israel W. Charny
President, International Association of Genocide Scholars
Chair, Joint Journal Committee of IAGS and IIGHRS
Roger W. Smith
Chair, Academic Advisory Board, International Institute for Genocide and Human
Rights Studies
Past President, International Association of Genocide Scholars
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Editors’ Introduction
Upon publication of this, the first issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention, we, the
four co-editors, are pleased to welcome you, the reader, to these pages. Our aim is to
produce a high-quality peer-reviewed journal that addresses cutting-edge issues in the
field of genocide studies and related areas such as preventive diplomacy, conflict
management, intervention, sanctions, and post-genocidal issues.
Prior to delineating the procedures we shall adhere to in evaluating manuscripts,
we wish to express our collective appreciation for the support and encouragement we
have received from diverse sources. Israel Charny and the board of the International
Association of Genocide Scholars have provided a constant source of encouragement.
They, along with the International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies
(IIGHRS), a division of the Zoryan Institute chaired by Roger W. Smith, were
instrumental in jointly conceptualizing the journal and co-developing the mission
statement. This partnership provided the legal and financial structures required for
such an undertaking. The partnership was further enhanced by the inclusion of the
University of Toronto Press, an outstanding academic publisher that has an existing
partnership with the Zoryan Institute. We would like to mention specifically the role
played by Greg Sarkissian, President of the IIGHRS, and George Shirinian, its
Executive Director, in coordinating these efforts with Israel Charny and Roger Smith.
Without the aid and encouragement of all these individuals, this journal would have
remained an idea without a physical presence.
Genocide Studies and Prevention is a peer-reviewed international journal. As such,
it adheres to the most vigorous academic standards, similar to those of longer-
standing scholarly journals such as the American Political Science Review and The
American Historical Review. Every manuscript submitted to the journal is sent to
three qualified referees in a double-blind review process. The editors read and assess
the referees’ comments and evaluations and decide upon publication, revisions and
resubmission, or rejection. It is no secret that the most highly regarded academic
journals reject more manuscripts than they accept. While we do not have a quota, we
do plan to subject every article we receive to the most rigorous standards of the
academy. Our goal is to produce a top-ranking journal in which articles present both
significant findings and innovative ideas. To achieve this goal, we vigorously
encourage readers such as you to submit their most significant work for consideration
by GSP, and we hope that, in the process of so doing, you will be joining us in this
exciting enterprise. In a very real sense, the success or failure of this endeavor depends
on your helping us as writers, reviewers, and readers. We hope you find this first issue,
as well as the ones that will follow, stimulating and informative.
Thank you for all your support.
Alex Alvarez
Herb Hirsch
Eric Markusen
Samuel Totten
Introduction to the Special Issue on Darfur
Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen
In launching the first issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention, we, the four editors
(Alex Alvarez, Herb Hirsch, Eric Markusen, and Samuel Totten), feel compelled to
address one of the most pressing issues facing genocide scholars today—the current
crisis in Darfur, Sudan. It is a crisis that erupted in early 2003 and continues today.
It is one in which government of Sudan troops (GoS) and the Janjaweed (Arab militia)
are responsible for the mass murder of an estimated 180,000 black Africans (primarily
from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit tribal groups) and possibly more than 250,000
others as a result of genocide by attrition (depriving the more than two million
internally displaced persons of adequate food, water, shelter, and medical care).
Once again—as happened in Rwanda in 1994 and in Srebrenica in 1995, to
mention but two instances—the international community’s response to the unfolding
crisis was late in coming and far too tepid and anemic when it did come. As far back as
December 2003, Jan Egeland, UN undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs,
declared Darfur to be the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, and yet the
international community proffered words over action in ‘‘addressing’’ the crisis. While
various non-governmental organizations decried the situation in Darfur, the UN
Security Council dithered by issuing one timid resolution after another in which it
made idle threats to sanction Sudan if the killing, mass displacement, mass rape, and
destruction continued. The mass murder—some, including the US government,
deemed it genocide, while others, including the UN, deemed it crimes against
humanity—continued unabated, but the United Nations did not see fit to alter its
response in any real way.
Instead of taking firm steps to halt the mass killing, rape, and wholesale
destruction of the black Africans’ villages and their way of life (it is estimated that
more than 2,000 black African villages have been utterly destroyed and burned to the
ground), the UN Security Council welcomed the African Union’s offer to deploy troops
as monitors in the Darfur area. The UN Security Council knew full well that the AU
mission would be not only undermanned and under-resourced but working with an
inadequate mandate, but it did not seem to care about such critical limitations and
liabilities. It is also true that the AU mission ostensibly provided the UN Security
Council with an easy ‘‘out.’’ That is, as long as the African Union was on the ground in
Darfur—and continued to demand that it be allowed to handle the crisis on its own—
the UN Security Council was more than willing to capitulate to these demands, for the
simple but profound reason that this provided the council with a rationale for not
acting. Such an approach also met the specific wishes of at least three of the
permanent members of the Security Council: China (which has huge petroleum
interests in Sudan), Russia (which has a large and extremely lucrative arms deal with
Sudan), and the United States (which now considers Sudan a partner in its so-called
war on terrorism). Once again, realpolitik won out over real humanitarian concern.
This special issue on Darfur provides a glimpse into various aspects of the crisis.
Rene´ Lemarchand, an expert on the Great Lakes region of Africa, contributes an
overview of the crisis that places it within the larger context of Sudan’s history. Scott
Straus, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, presents a
comparative study of the genocides perpetrated in Rwanda (in 1994) and in Darfur.
Samuel Totten, a scholar of genocide studies at the University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville, provides a critique of the US State Department’s Atrocities
Documentation Project—whose data resulted in the determination by the US
government that genocide had been (and possibly continued to be) perpetrated in
Darfur—along with a critique of the motives and ramifications of the ‘‘finding’’ of
genocide. Kelly D. Askin, a lawyer, scholar, and expert on mass rape, delineates and
discusses the crimes that have been perpetrated against girls and women in Darfur
since early 2003. Jerry Fowler, a lawyer and the staff director of the Committee
on Conscience at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, presents an
argument as to why and how, under international law, the situation in Darfur
constitutes genocide. Finally, Canadian military officer Major Brent Beardsley,
who served as personal assistant to the force commander of the United Nations
Mission in Rwanda during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, reflects on the failure of
the international community to stop the genocide in Rwanda and the significance of
the latter vis-a-vis the ongoing tragedy in Darfur.
The aim of this special issue on Darfur is to provide readers with a sense of what is
taking place on the ground in Darfur, the international community’s reaction to the
crisis, and the ramifications of the latter for the people of Darfur, and for efforts to
develop effective means for preventing and/or stanching genocide. In many ways, it is
also a lamentation for lives lost and an expression of frustration and anger over what
could have been but wasn’t, since the international community seems stuck in its
affinity for realpolitik.
Introduction to the Special Issue on Darfur
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Unsimplifying Darfur
Rene´ Lemarchand
Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science,
University of Florida
Much of the debate about genocide in Darfur appears woefully misinformed about
the complex realities of the crisis, in particular its growing imbrication with the
conflict in neighboring Chad. The parallel with Rwanda is limited, even though, in
both cases, the international community has failed utterly to stop the atrocities
committed against innocent civilians. No prevention strategy is likely to succeed
unless cross-border raids from Chad into Darfur and vice versa are stopped, and
this will not happen as long as the Sudanese and Chadian authorities are playing
one faction off against another in what looks increasingly like a proxy war.
Genocide should not be seen as the sole touchstone for intervention. War crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and atrocity crimes, to name only some of the horrors illustrated
by the Darfur tragedy, provide ample justification, moral and political, for the
international community to take concerted action to protect civilian lives. The most
urgent task facing the international community is not to strive for a consensus
about genocide but to frame an effective prevention strategy. For this to happen,
immediate attention must be paid to the crisis in Chad, which could unleash
renewed cross-border violence, destabilize the De´by regime in Ndjamena, and
ultimately play into the hands of Khartoum.
There is no sign of an early end to Darfur’s agonies. If anything, the growing
interconnection between insurgents in the Western Sudan and their allies in Chad has
made a viable solution all the more remote.1 Since February 2003, when Arab–African
tensions erupted into a full-scale confrontation, anywhere from 200,000 to 400,000
have perished in the course of the violence unleashed by Khartoum-backed militias
(Janjaweeds) upon civilians, to which must be added 1.8 million displaced in Darfur
and 200,000 inside Chad. Dozens of villages in that country, north and south of the
strategic border town of Adre´, have been the targets of murderous cross-border raids
mounted by Arab militias. The litany of crimes committed by the ‘‘evil horsemen’’—the
literal meaning of ‘‘Janjaweed’’—ranges from the killing and maiming of civilians
to rape and abduction, and from the burning down of houses and shelters to the
destruction of farmland and the theft of cattle. In the climate of insecurity spreading
across the hundreds of kilometers of borderlands, the capacity of humanitarian non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to reach the growing population of refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) whose lives are at risk is becoming ever more
limited.
The political risks and the costs in human lives are not limited to Darfur. In
southern Sudan, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005,
intended to bring to an end the long simmering North–South civil war, is gravely
imperiled. And the prospects of widening factional violence in Chad loom increasingly
large on the horizon. As Nicholas Kristof has correctly observed, ‘‘Chad may collapse
into civil war, chaos and banditry, like Darfur itself but on a much larger scale.’’2
With an ever-greater number of Chadian and Darfurian Africans seeking Khartoum’s
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assistance in their fight against the Chadian regime, the ethno-political equation is
every day becoming more complicated.
The thoroughly inadequate response of the international community in the face
of such unmitigated human disaster raises further questions. As is becoming more
evident every day, the performance of the African Union (AU) in Darfur—officially
designated as the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)—falls short of expectations.
Only under considerable international pressure and promise of financial assistance,
following the collapse of the 8 April 2004 ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese
government and the insurgents, did the AU agree to send in a monitoring force of some
4,000 men, consisting in large part of Nigerians (1,200) and a few hundred Rwandan
troops. To this must be added 700 military observers, whose observations have done
little to lower the temperature. Despite generous funding from the United States and
the European Union—estimated at half a billion US dollars—the AU mission has been
notoriously ineffective in preventing the raiders from committing atrocities against
civilians.
Samantha Power’s sobering assessment is worth bearing in mind:
The AU mission is clearly overwhelmed. Its teams, spread out across an area the size of
France, manage at most three patrols per day in various sectors of the region, and
African countries are hardly eager to send in more soldiers . . . . Soon this stopgap
mission will fail not only those in need of protection but all the other interested parties
as well. The Western powers have already spent more than a billion dollars feeding
refugees in camps that feel increasingly permanent, and it is nearly inevitable that, as
in the West Bank and Pakistan, some Muslims in these camps will be radicalized and
take up arms locally, or, perhaps, further afield.3
The image of radicalized refugees ‘‘taking up arms locally, or, perhaps, further
afield’’ brings to mind another crisis situation of appalling proportions: more than a
million Hutu refugees sought asylum in eastern Congo in the wake of the Rwandan
genocide, including hundreds, possibly thousands, of ge´nocidaires who later launched
deadly raids into Rwanda. But the fate of Hutu refugees in eastern Congo is by no
means the only—or, indeed, the most relevant—parallel with the situation in Darfur.
The Ghosts of Rwanda
If anyone deserves credit for drawing public attention to our inability to learn any
lesson from the Rwandan carnage, it is Eric Reeves, whose eloquent wake-up calls in
the media and on the Internet have yet to be heeded by policy makers. Comparing
AMIS to the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), headed by Lt. Gen. Rome´o
Dallaire, he notes that ‘‘we are witnessing an equivalently dishonest and cowardly
failure’’ and that ‘‘the AU is no more capable of halting the ongoing destruction of
primarily African tribal populations than Dallaire was able to halt the interahamwe or
deter Hutu extremists of the Rwandan government and military.’’ ‘‘The ghosts of
Rwanda,’’ Reeves concludes, ‘‘are stirring ominously in Darfur. Differences in
geography, history, and genocidal means do less and less to obscure the ghastly
similarities between international failure in 1994 and the world’s current willingness
to allow ethnically-targeted human destruction to proceed essentially unchecked.’’ And
because of this appalling inertia, leading to a death toll ‘‘exceeding 400,000,’’ he
speculates that ‘‘with human mortality poised to increase significantly in coming
weeks and months, there is no clear evidence that Rwanda’s unspeakable slaughter
will not eventually be numerically surpassed.’’4
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Not even the most casual observer of Darfur’s agony can remain insensitive to the
scale of the human suffering unfolding in this forbidding dystopia. But it takes more
than a superficial acquaintance with the history, geography, and politics of the region
to appreciate how radically different from that of Rwanda is the context of the killings
in Darfur. Unlike Rwanda (26,000km2), Darfur covers a huge expanse of territory. In a
space of some 450,000km2, approximately ten times the size of Rwanda, the population
is estimated to be between 3.5 and 4 million,5 that is, half that of Rwanda, much of it
distributed among scores of small village communities. This basic fact speaks volumes
about the enormous logistical difficulties facing the now 7,000-strong AU monitoring
force in its Sisyphean efforts to stop the hemorrhage.
Whether the carnage should be seen as genocide or as a case of ethnic cleansing
run amok is where the Rwanda analogy begs the question, and opinions differ. While
the official stance of the Bush administration is unequivocal in its use of the ‘‘G-word,’’
the European Union and the United Nations have been notoriously reluctant to
describe the killings in such terms. For all his searing criticisms of the Bush policies in
Darfur, Eric Reeves is clearly on the same wavelength in detecting ‘‘genocidal intent.’’
In his testimony before the Africa Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives
on 11 March 2004, Reeves explained that while ‘‘the current phrase of choice among
diplomats and UN officials is ‘ethnic cleansing,’ given the nature and scale of human
destruction and the clear racism animating attacks systematically directed against
civilians from the African tribal groups, the appropriate term is genocide.’’6 Nicholas
Kristof—who, in his New York Times op-eds, has done more to sensitize the American
public to the horrors of Darfur than most other commentators—would concur.
‘‘Darfur,’’ he writes, ‘‘is just the latest chapter in a sorry history of repeated inaction in
the face of genocide, from that of Armenians, through the Holocaust, to the slaughter of
Cambodians, Bosnians and Rwandans.’’7
It is noteworthy, however, that both Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch (HRW) have carefully avoided the use of the word, opting instead for ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ as a more appropriate term.8 Similarly, the 2004 Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur grudgingly admits that human rights violations were
committed ‘‘by people who might have acted with genocidal intentions,’’ but concludes
that ‘‘there was not sufficient evidence to indicate that Khartoum had a state policy
intended to exterminate a particular racial or ethnic groups.’’9
Given that there are differences of opinion among scholars as to what constitutes
genocide, such divergences of opinion are not too surprising. For some, the question of
establishing the evidence of genocide is irrelevant; more important is to use the
‘‘G-word’’ as a tool to mobilize public opinion. For others, however, the crucial issue is
whether we are dealing with genocide as defined in the 1948 UN Convention on
Genocide (‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part’’) or something else—e.g., ethnic
cleansing, or the use of force to crush a rebellion. For Ge´rard Prunier, much depends
on how we define genocide: ‘‘if we use the 1948 UN definition it is obvious that Darfur
is a genocide,’’ but not if by genocide we mean a ‘‘total obliteration’’ of the victim
group.10 In an article whose title questions what others have taken for granted—‘‘Is It
Genocide?’’11—Nelson Kasfir argues that even though there is no doubt about the
identity of the perpetrators, or about their determination to destroy ‘‘in whole or in
part’’ the African population, the element of intent remains unclear. He suggests that
the aim of Khartoum could just as well be seen as an attempt to crush a rebellion, not
to commit genocide. This is consistent with the distinction drawn by Jacques Se´melin
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between genocide, which involves ‘‘the total eradication of a collectivity, as defined by
those whose self-assigned task is to annihilate it,’’ and ethnic cleansing or massacres
aimed at enforcing submission.12 For Se´melin—and many others—the killings in
Darfur would fit into the latter category, involving a partial destruction in order to
bring about global submission.13
Compounding the difficulty of establishing genocidal intent is the problem of
discriminating between Arabs and Africans, where both share many of the same
cultural traits, including religion and language, and where both victims and killers are
found among members of the same community.
Africans vs. Arabs?
As Darfur’s name indicates, the Fur people has given its name to an area that
comprises not just the Fur but a complex mix of African and Arab populations. ‘‘The
population of Darfur,’’ Gustav Nachtigal wrote in the 1870s, ‘‘may be divided on
the one hand into Negroes and Arabs, or on the other into its original inhabitants and
the conquered peoples or foreigners.’’14 This Arab/African polarity did not rule out a
common set of regional identities, or, for that matter multiple identities. A central
theme of Darfur’s precolonial history refers to the process of early state formation
around the ancient seventeenth-century sultanate whose core area was the
mountainous region of Jebel Marra. Territorial expansion went hand in hand with
ethnic absorption, with the Fur people serving as the pivot around which a specific
ethno-regional identity eventually developed.15 Anyone familiar with Nachtigal’s
painstaking description of the ‘‘Organization of the Fur State’’16 cannot fail to be
impressed by the extraordinary complexity and highly bureaucratized character of
this archaic yet inherently fragile state system, soon to collapse under the combined
onslaught of the Turco-Egyptian conquest, the Mahdist revolt,17 and, ultimately,
the imposition of colonial controls. The resulting political vacuum has yet to be filled.
However dated—and not always exempt of ethnic biases18—Nachtigal’s narrative
makes clear to the reader the danger of reducing Darfurians to a simple racial
dichotomy. Cutting across the ‘‘Negro vs. Arab’’ fault line, he notes, are countless other
divisions, as between those who pay tribute and those who do not, those ‘‘who have
equal rights’’ and those who do not, those who are of foreign origins (from Bornu and
Baguirmi) and the autochthons, those tribes that were conquered and those that
successfully resisted conquest, and so forth.19 Some groups are nomads, others semi-
nomads or sedentary, among both Africans and Arabs. And there are those Africans
‘‘who appear by mixing with Arab tribes to have been transformed centuries ago,
and now live in Darfur among the Rezeqat, where they can no longer be distinguished
from the Arabs either physically or socially.’’20 By way of example, Nachtigal cites
a Zaghawa sub-group, the ‘‘Zoghawa [sic] Amm Kimmelte,’’ which comes as a surprise
when one considers the strong and unanimous identification of today’s Zaghawa with
the African community.
The Arabs, likewise, are divided into numerous sub-groups, some of which are
found in both Chad and Sudan. In his listing of ‘‘major non-Arab groups’’ and ‘‘major
Arab groups,’’ Alex de Waal, a leading authority on Darfur, comes up with a total of
seven Arab and fifteen non-Arab communities, each in turn divided into subcategories.
Although Arabs form the bulk of the Janjaweed—the instrument used by Khartoum to
kill, maim, or displace Africans civilians—de Waal notes that ‘‘the largest and most
influential of Darfur’s Arabs are not involved, including the Baggara, Rizeigat,
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the Habbaniya, the Ma’aliya, and most of the Ta’aisha.’’21 As in Rwanda, the tendency
in Darfur is to identify the ‘‘bad guys’’ with an entire ethnic community.
The distinction between Arabs and Africans is, to a large extent, a social construct
(not unlike the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi). De Waal calls the Arab vs. African
dichotomy ‘‘historically bogus, but disturbingly powerful.’’22 The labels, after all, are by
no means exclusive. There has been in the past considerable intermarriage between
the two groups, and identity switches are by no means uncommon, a phenomenon
again reminiscent of relations between Hutu and Tutsi. Both communities are Muslim,
and Arabic is widely spoken among them. Although sporadic conflicts between Arabs
and Africans were not unheard of in colonial and precolonial times, the scale of today’s
carnage has no precedent in history. What is unprecedented, too, is the extent to which
ideology and propaganda, originating from within and outside Sudan, have
contributed to the growing polarization of ethnic identities.
The Roots of Carnage
As in the case of Rwanda, no single-factor analysis will do to explain the cause of
Darfur’s tragedy. We are confronted with an array of forces and circumstances that
goes far beyond the boundaries of Sudan. Most observers would agree that the
triggering factor was the surprise attack on El Fasher, in April 2003, by the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA), the principal and earliest insurgent faction, resulting in the
destruction of seven military aircraft and the death of about 100 people. But El Fasher
was only the symptom of more fundamental factors.
Of these, perhaps the most consequential has to do with the steady advance of
desertification through much of northern Darfur, resulting in devastating famine.
According to Prunier, what is known locally as the maja’a al-gutala (‘‘the famine that
kills’’) caused the death of an estimated 95,000 people from August 1984 to November
1985.23 With the massive population movements from north to south—and with Arab
cattle herders moving in ever-increasing numbers into those areas of the south less
affected by the drought—a series of local clashes over land erupted, first between Fur
and Arabs in the Jebel Marra area (1987–1989), then between Massalit and Arabs
(1996–1998).24 Each time the parties to a conflict reached out to the Arab-dominated
provincial government for a fair settlement, the government consistently sided with
the Arabs.
The spread of a stridently pro-Islamic ideology did little to diminish the
government’s blatant favoritism toward Arabs. The roots of what de Waal calls ‘‘an
Arab supremacist ideology’’ are to be found, in part, in ideas indigenous to the Sudan—
generally associated with Hasan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front and later his
Popular Congress. Just as important, however, has been the export of ‘‘Arabism’’ from
Chad and Libya.
The Chadian side of the story, in a nutshell, involves a warlord named Acyl
Ahmed, who, as head of the Arme´e du Volcan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was
able to mobilize a large number of Chadian Arabs against Hisse`ne Habre´’s Forces
Arme´es du Nord (‘‘Northern Army’’). Of all the Trojan horses produced by Colonel
Muammar Gaddafi’s stable, Acyl was by far the most faithful. Although he died in
1982, his pro-Arab ideology is still alive. For this, much of the credit goes to Gaddafi.
After suffering a major defeat in northern Chad at the hands of Habre´ in 1987, the
Libyan leader turned his attention to Darfur. To carve out for himself another sphere
of influence and hold aloft the banner of the ‘‘Arab Gathering’’ (Al tajammu al-arabi)—
a ‘‘militantly racist and pan-Arabist organization,’’ Prunier informs us25—some 2,000
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Islamic Legion troops were sent to Darfur in 1987. The ideological seeds of the present
conflict, in short, were planted long before the attack on El Fasher.26
Exactly how the southern rebellion has affected its counterpart in Darfur is not
entirely clear. Through the years, going back to the Federal Democratic Alliance of
former Darfur governor Ibrahim Deraige, the Southern Peoples Liberation Army
(SPLA) has given moral and financial support to the African resistance in Darfur, but
in so doing it has unwittingly stimulated factional disputes about the distribution of
arms and money. If the SPLA struggle in the south served as an example to emulate,
this does not mean that it has always been to the advantage of the Darfurian rebels.
Again, considerable ambiguity surrounds the fallout of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) signed by Khartoum and the SPLA in the south in January 2005.
The effect, arguably, has been to encourage the insurgents to make every effort to
wrest a similar agreement from Khartoum, while at the same time contributing to a
hardening of the position of the central government on meeting their demands: after
virtually giving up the monopoly of the ruling party, in line with the CPA, it is now
dead set against any further erosion of its executive power.
A Fractured Insurgency
The fragmentation of the insurgency into rival factions, though rarely mentioned—let
alone explicated—in the media, is not the least of the obstacles to peace. Only recently
has Kristof—one the most insistent and articulate critics of Western policies in
Darfur—grudgingly recognized that ‘‘some responsibility attaches to the rebels in
Darfur,’’ as ‘‘they have been fighting each other instead of negotiating a peace with the
government that would end the bloodbath.’’27 Yet there has been bitter infighting
among rebels almost from the beginning. No sooner was the SLA created, in early
2003, than a violent struggle for the leadership of the movement began to surface.
Today, the bulk of the insurgents are drawn from the Zaghawa, Fur, and Massalit
‘‘tribes,’’ with the Zaghawa straddling the boundary between Chad and Darfur. Each is
divided into sub-groups, with the Zaghawa, for example, split between Tuer, Bideyat,
and Kobe, and each sub-group in turn divided into clans. The persistence of intra-
Zaghawa factionalism, as we shall see, is crucial to an understanding of the complex
interconnections between the Darfur-based insurgents and their kinsmen in Chad.
If the Zaghawa have been the driving force behind the insurgency, this is because
many ‘‘had acquired professional military training in the Chadian or Sudanese armies,
a fact that has caused them to predominate in the upper ranks of the insurgency to this
day.’’28 This also helps explain why they came to be viewed with considerable suspicion
by Fur and Massalit elements—but leaves unanswered the question of how they ended
up fighting each other. Part of the answer lies in the multiplicity of sub-ethnic and
clanic fissures among the Zaghawa. The really critical factor, however, has to do with
the impact of Chadian politics on the rebellion. Just as Darfur has had a significant
backlash effect in Chad, the reverse is equally true.29
The insurgents are divided into two principal rival armed factions, the SLA and
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the latter, the weaker of the two, drawing
much of its support from Zaghawa Kobe and the former from Tuer and Bideyat as well
as Fur and Massalit. The SLA, founded in February 2003, is decidedly secular in
orientation, while the JEM remains highly receptive to Hasan al-Turabi’s brand of
Islamic ideology.30 The SLA, moreover, claims a more diversified ethnic membership,
which is also why it is more vulnerable to internal dissention.
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The early history of the SLA provides a dramatic illustration of the potential for
disintegration inherent in its ethnic composition. At first, every effort was made to
include representatives of each major ethnic group in its leadership. Thus, while the
chairmanship of the movement was given to a Fur (Abdel Wahid Mohammed el-Nur),
the deputy chairmanship went to a Massalit (Mansour Arbab) and the military
command to a Zaghawa (Abdallah Abakar, replaced after his death by Minni Arko
Minnawi). After receiving substantial support from Zaghawa elements in the Chadian
military, Minnawi’s Zaghawa scored a number of military successes against the
Khartoum government, only to raise the anxieties of Fur elements. A bitter struggle
for leadership ensued between Fur and Zaghawa. In the words of a recent
International Crisis Group report,
the rapid expansion and intensification of the conflict overwhelmed the leaders and
their nascent structures. Over time, the animosity between Minni and Abdel Wahid
grew as they jostled for primacy. Whereas Minni assumes that Zaghawa military
strength should be reflected in the leadership, Abdel Wahid and other non-Zaghawa
insist on the original tribal allocations of positions, including a Fur as chairman.31
Although the origins of divisions within the insurgency are inseparable from
Darfur’s fragmented social identities, thesedivisionshavebeengreatly intensifiedby the
growing involvement of Chadian factions in the politics of the rebellion, and vice versa.
The Chadian Connection
Long before the emergence of Darfur as a flashpoint of conflict, the Sudan had been a
key player in the struggle for power between Idriss Deby, Chad’s incumbent president,
a Zaghawa of Bideyat origins, and his immediate rival, Hisse`ne Habre´. If Deby
ultimately came out on top, routing Habre´ and his Toubou warriors in the course of a
daring raid on Ndjamena in December 1990, it was because of the massive support he
received from Darfur-based Zaghawa elements, many of Kobe origin, with the
blessings of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Beshir. His indebtedness to al-Beshir
helps explain Deby’s initial reluctance to get involved on the side of the insurgents.
By late 2005, however, he had no other choice but to turn against his former ally.
On 7 December 2005, a Sudan-backed Chadian rebel faction based in Darfur attacked
Guereda, some 120km north of Adre´, killing ten Chadians and wounding five. A few
days later, on 18 December, an even more brutal raid was launched on Adre´.
The attacks were promptly denounced by Deby as a Khartoum-instigated maneuver
to destabilize his regime.
It is easy to see, in such circumstances, why Deby should be viewed with the
greatest distaste by his former benefactor. Perhaps less obvious is that after
consistently playing one faction off against another, and with his army on the verge
of disintegration, Deby now has very little room to maneuver. For fear of antagonizing
Khartoum, he first turned down demands for assistance from the SLA while secretly
encouraging the rise of a breakaway faction within the Kobe-dominated JEM,
the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD). Another split emerged
in April 2005 following a trial of strength between JEM’S field commander,
Mohammed Salih Harba, and its top leader, Khalil Ibrahim, leading to the creation
of a Provisional Revolutionary Collective Leadership Council, causing some observers
to see in this latest dissidence the evil hand of Idriss Deby.
The result of all this has been a drastic shrinkage of Deby’s bases of support within
the army, as shown by the recent defections suffered by his 30,000-strong Chadian
National Army (CNA). Top-heavy, poorly trained, rife with internecine quarrels over
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pay and promotions, the upper ranks of the military include no fewer than sixty
generals and 256 colonels.32 Exactly how many have joined the insurgents is unknown.
Reports indicate that on 9 December 2005, at least 349 soldiers and eighty-two officers
joined the rebellion; another 400 troops followed on 16 February 2006, led by generals
Seby Aguid and Issaka Diar, along with some thirty high-ranking officers. Many of the
defectors are of Kobe origin and are deeply resentful of Deby’s indifference to the fate
of their kinsmen across the border in Darfur. But there is also growing evidence that
they have been joined by a fair number of Bideyat, whose grievances stem from Deby’s
less than cooperative attitude in meeting the demands of the SLA. A major blow to the
regime came with the defection of Tom Erdimi, a prominent Zaghawa, who once served
as coordinator of the Chadian petroleum project. His ‘‘Socle pour le Changement,
l’Unite´ et la De´mocratie’’ (‘‘Base for Change, Unity, and Democracy’’; SCUD) has since
emerged as a key anti-Deby politico-military group.33
Further complicating the political equation, a large number of Chadian Arabs have
joined hands with the Janjaweed, while a growing number of Chadian and Darfurian
Africans are being supported by Khartoum in their efforts to destabilize the Deby
regime. One well-informed Chadian observer told this writer, in March 2004, that the
majority of the Arabs involved in human rights abuses were Chadian Arabs, many of
Juhaina origins. Their expectation, presumably, is that Khartoum will return the
favor and help them overthrow Deby, in a replay of the scenario that brought Deby to
power in 1990. While the recruitment of Chadian Arabs has been going on since 2004,
if not earlier, only now is fear of retaliation by non-Arab Chadians an important motive
for crossing into Darfur. In the words of a recent Human Rights Watch (HRW) report,
‘‘Chadian Arabs from the area south of Adre´ have recently been crossing into Sudan in
numbers significant enough to raise concern among humanitarian workers that the
migration is being driven by fear of retaliatory attacks at the hands of non-Arabs.’’34
Arabs are not the only group seeking Deby’s overthrow. The rebel attack that
nearly brought down the Ndjamena regime on 14 April 200635 must be credited to the
‘‘Front Uni pour le Changement De´mocratique’’ (‘‘United Front for Democratic
Change’’; FUC), led by Mahamat Nour, a Chadian African of Tama origins whose
political base is the ‘‘Rassemblement pour la De´mocratie et la Liberte´’’ (‘‘Gathering for
Democracy and Freedom’’; RDL), a predominantly Tama organization and one of
several groups affiliated to the FUC. Significantly, Nour is said to enjoy the full
backing of Khartoum in his fight against Deby. Suffice it to say that it was none other
than Nour who, back in 2003, took the initiative in organizing groups of Janjaweed,
with Khartoum’s blessings.
How to prevent the army from unraveling is the key issue facing Deby. It lies at
the heart of the stalemate between the Chadian government and the World Bank.36
The bank’s decision to freeze Chad’s offshore oil–revenue account is understandable,
given that the government is in material breach of its loan contract. Deby’s immediate
concern, however, is to find the financial resources needed to avoid a further
disintegration of his armed forces. Although the domestic backlash of the Darfur
insurgency poses a clear and present danger to his Zaghawa-dominated state, whether
he can throw to the winds his obligation to set aside a substantial portion of
the oil revenue for poverty alleviation and still meet the demands of the army is
anybody’s guess.
With the emergence of Chadian opposition factions seeking sanctuary in Darfur,
new actors have entered the fray, determined to overthrow the Deby regime. Since the
attack on Adre´ by the RDL, a Chadian faction based in Darfur, six other opposition
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movements have joined the RDL to form the FUC. So far the SCUD has been unwilling
to rally to the FUC. Khartoum apparently made every effort to persuade Nour to hand
the leadership of the coalition to Tom Erdimi, an invitation Nour promptly declined.37
The factional split between Tama and Zaghawa is only one of the many fractures
undermining the Chadian opposition. Whether and how far to enter into a tactical
alliance with Khartoum is another source of division. The stakes, in short, are
perceived differently depending on the groups concerned, their ethno-regional profile,
and their leadership patterns.
The Limits of the Genocide Template
Given the complexity of the forces on the ground, questions are bound to arise as to the
pertinence of the genocide model as a point of entry for explicating the Darfur crisis.
Unfortunately, there seems to be growing confusion among scholars and observers
between honest disagreements and what passes for an unacceptable denial of genocide.
It is one thing to posit genocide as a given, from which are derived certain logical
conclusions about the state of the play on the ground, and quite another to proceed by
induction to test the validity of that assumption.
From all the evidence available, there are serious reasons to question the identities
of the targeted groups, the extent to which the perpetrators are manipulated by
Khartoum, and their intent to exterminate. Today the struggle is not only between
Arabs and Africans but among Africans. Furthermore, while there is considerable
evidence to show the involvement of the Khartoum authorities in recruiting and
arming Arab militias, Je´roˆme Tubiana, a leading French authority on Darfur, paints a
more complex situation in which ‘‘the extent to which the Sudan government controls
the janjawids remains unclear.’’38 He cites a Fur intellectual to the effect that ‘‘the
government has in part lost control (of the janjawids)’’ and goes on to note that
control over the Arab militias operates within three circles: the first consists of local
leaders, including traditional chiefs, politicians and intellectuals . . . , the second
involves Darfur-based Arab personalities, army men and politicians, close to the
seats of power in Khartoum, who act as intermediaries between Khartoum and local
leaders . . . , [and] the third refers to the hard-liners in Khartoum, i.e. Jellaba Arabs
from north Sudan, specifically Shagiya Arabs. This Shagiya circle would seem to have
gained sufficient weight to challenge president al Beshir himself, also a Jellaba, but
who belongs to the Jaalin group.39
Control over the Chadian Arabs would seem to lie primarily with the first of these
groups. As for the key element in the definition of genocide, the intent to exterminate,
the record shows that such has not always been the case. In the words of the most
recent HRW report on Darfur,
as markets in Darfur have been disrupted by violence and population dislocation,
normal commerce is being replaced by a war economy in which livestock raiding and
looting feature prominently. Hence, janjawids cross-border raids appear to be
motivated heavily by considerations of profit, as cattle, horses, food and even household
items such as straw mats and cups have been looted . . .Statements attributed to
janjawids by eyewitnesses suggest that the appropriation of land may be another
motivation for the violence.40
What emerges from all this is a pattern of violence aimed at the forced removal of
specific ethnic communities, a phenomenon much closer to ethnic cleansing than to
genocide. This does not mean that the abominations committed against Africans by
Arabs, or by other African rebel groups, are less objectionable than those described as
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genocidal killings, or that ethnic cleansing or ‘‘massive violations of human rights,’’
to use Kofi Annan’s expression, deserve less moral attention. Scale makes little
difference when human lives are at stake. What it does mean is that analysts owe it to
themselves to be self-conscious in their use of language when it comes to making sense
of mass violence.
There are practical implications as well. One is compelled to wonder whether
accusations of genocide, given the ambiguity of the evidence, are the best way to induce
a change of attitude on the part of the Khartoum authorities. Which is not to say that
a different language would produce miracles. At first grudgingly amenable to a UN
intervention, the al-Beshir government is now adamantly opposed to a transfer of
responsibility for peacekeeping to the UN, and there is no indication that the African
Union is prepared to challenge that decision, even though it has agreed ‘‘in principle to
a transition from AMIS to a UN operation.’’41 While the dialogue between Khartoum
and the international community appears to have reached an impasse, the AU
is unwilling to take a firm stand on the atrocities committed by the Sudan government.
If anything, the AU’s decision to block an EU-sponsored resolution in the UN General
Assembly’s social and humanitarian committee to end the culture of impunity and
disarm the militias responsible for the massacres—while reminding donors that
‘‘an average of US$22,857,719 is required in cash each month’’ for AMIS to continue
its operations42—smacks of humbug. So, too, the explanation proffered by Nigeria,
representing the AU, to the effect that ‘‘any condemnatory action would endanger the
peace talks.’’43 When one considers the AU’s apparent determination to stymie all
attempts at blowing the whistle on Khartoum, the ongoing debate about genocide
sounds distressingly hollow.
There are ample reasons to agree with Scott Straus that the debate about genocide
misses the central point about Darfur:
Darfur has shown that the energy spent fighting over whether to call the events there
‘‘genocide’’ was misplaced, overshadowing difficult but more important questions about
how to craft an effective response to mass violence against civilians in Sudan. The task
ahead is to do precisely that: to find a way to stop the killing, lest tens of thousands
more die.44
Those lines were written in late 2004. Since then thousands have died.
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Holding Leaders Accountable in the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for
Gender Crimes Committed in Darfur
Kelly Dawn Askin
This article discusses how rape and other forms of sexual violence have been
prominent features of the ongoing attacks (from 2003 to the present) committed by
government of Sudan (GoS) troops and the Janjaweed (Arab militia) in Darfur,
Sudan. It first provides a historical overview of wartime rape in law and society,
then discusses some of the many reports (including the UN’s Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur) that have documented the perpetration of rape and other forms of sexual
violence in Darfur by GoS troops and Janjaweed. Following a discussion of specific
cases of rape and other sexual crimes committed in Darfur, the author discusses
how such crimes can be and have been prosecuted as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. Among the other issues discussed in the essay are the
concepts of individual and superior responsibility, as they relate to prosecuting
those responsible for sexual violence, and the critical need to hold leaders
accountable for sex crimes.
Sex crimes have a devastating impact far beyond the individuals physically violated
by the assaults—these assaults destroy lives, families, communities, and associated
groups. Not only must those who survive the violence suffer an attack committed
against the most intimate, sacred parts of their bodies but they are also, especially if
the crime committed against them is reported to authorities or becomes known, forced
to endure the additional psychological, familial, social, cultural, legal, and religious
implications of these attacks, both on themselves and on others. No other form of
violence has such a broad-reaching adverse impact on both victims and associated
groups. Vile acts such as amputating limbs, beheading, and torture instill horror, but
these crimes do not routinely cast stigmas or affect marriageability.
To intensify fear and humiliation, rapes in many violent conflicts are committed
publicly and by more than one assailant. Women’s reproductive capacity—including
their potential to bear children for the victim or the victimizer group—is one of
numerous reasons women and girls are singled out for sexual assault. Discriminatory
laws, customs, and practices regulating female sexual activity and sexual purity
impose additional harms, instead of conferring protection. More detrimental
consequences of sexual violence, such as HIV/AIDS, other contagious sexually
transmitted diseases or infections, and damage to the reproductive system, are also
common. Furthermore, the shame and stigma wrongly imputed to victims of sex
crimes and to their families; the historical practice of criminal justice systems (police,
prosecutors, judges, legislators) that marginalize or ignore rape crimes or, worse,
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revictimize the victims; the sheer terror that threats of such crimes evoke; the severe
medical and reproductive repercussions; and the simple fact that, for countless
cowardly combatants, unlawfully attacking an unarmed woman or girl and raping her
is more ‘‘attractive’’ than legitimately attacking an armed soldier/militia member—
these are some of the reasons that sexual violence has become such an effective and
potent instrument of war and vehicle of terror and destruction.
Rape and other forms of sexual violence have been prominent features of attacks
committed by government of Sudan (GoS) forces and their Janjaweed (JJW) proxy
against non-Arabs in all three states of Darfur. In fact, it is difficult to find a
comprehensive report on the most serious crimes committed in Darfur that does not
include sex crimes. Murder, rape, pillage, forced displacement, and razing of villages
are part and parcel of ground attacks. If a village attack involves either GoS forces or
their Janjaweed puppets and collaborators on the ground, rape virtually always forms
part of the attack. Even in instances when the primary purpose of a particular attack
is not to kill or displace civilians but instead, for example, to steal their cattle, rape still
routinely occurs. And when the primary purpose of an attack is to inflict maximum
harm on the civilians and drive survivors into the desert and out of the territory, sex
crimes are particularly rampant and vicious.1
A multitude of reports on crimes committed in Darfur has been published over the
past two years, and, as in other armed conflicts around the world, these reports
confirm that sexual violence is committed both strategically and opportunistically in
Darfur.2 Opportunistic rapes are committed because the atmosphere of war and the
violence, lawlessness, chaos, and hatred it produces create the opportunity. Random
rapes cause as much fear and trauma as orchestrated crimes, sometimes more, because
of their unpredictability. Once it becomes clear that superiors do not disapprove of
sexual violence, the opportunistic rapes typically become more public, more frequent,
and more vicious, growing indistinguishable from and becoming part of the organized
rapes committed, at least in part, to inflict widespread terror and harm on the targeted
group.
Even if it cannot be proved that rape was officially encouraged or initially
intended, when the crimes become well known and superiors fail to disapprove of
them, or acquiesce and tolerate the abuse, this signals tacit approval. And, in fact, the
whole world was repeatedly informed of the rapes in Darfur. Undoubtedly, political
and military leaders in Sudan knew of them, and their silence demonstrated official
tolerance and even encouragement. By the time the government expressed its
purported outrage over the rapes, they had been raging unabated for some two years;
hundreds of thousands had been killed, millions were displaced, and Darfur was in
shambles as a result of the scorched-earth policy of the GoS. The conditions of life
intentionally inflicted upon black Darfuris are so dire that women and girls have been
forced to knowingly risk rape by venturing outside internally displaced persons (IDP)
camps for the food and firewood they need to survive inside the camps.
The Historical Treatment of Wartime Rape in Law and Society
Since the beginning of recorded wartime history, rape has been a common character-
istic of armed conflict. From Viking invasions to the Crusades to World Wars I and II,
and the hundreds of intra- and international armed conflicts in between, there is a
litany of reports of rape and other sexual atrocities committed during the course of the
conflict. The literature is so replete with depictions of rape during war that it
is exceptional to read in detail about one (war) without reading about the other (rape).
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Yet, until relatively recently, most reports depicted sexual assault as an inevitable
consequence, a regrettable byproduct, or simply a common feature of war, not as a
serious crime, much less a means of attack that could in fact significantly and
dramatically affect the war.
Beginning in the late Middle Ages, the customs of war gradually began to treat
rape as a war crime and not as the legitimate right of a victor—part of the so-called
spoils of war—as had been largely accepted until about the fifteenth century. For
centuries, rape was considered primarily a crime committed against a man’s property.
By the end of the nineteenth century, wartime rape was widely criminalized but
seldom punished. Even by the mid-twentieth century, rape was regarded principally as
a crime against honor or dignity, not a crime of violence.3 And there is little indication
that it was then considered as bad as—or worse than—death.
In contemporary law, sexual violence is a crime under both customary and codified
laws. More recently, wartime rape was explicitly forbidden by the Fourth Geneva
Convention (1949) and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977).4
Furthermore, the laws of war strictly mandate that combatants direct attacks solely
against military objectives, including other combatants; they can never lawfully direct
attacks against civilians or civilian objects.5 When militaries respect the laws of war,
promote notions of honor, and even, perhaps, punish those of their own soldiers who
commit sex crimes, rape still occurs (as it does in law-abiding societies during
peacetime.) Even when rape is strictly forbidden by superiors who enforce the laws and
take measures to prevent or punish the crime, though it takes place less frequently,
and certainly less conspicuously, it remains a persistent occurrence (as do other war
crimes). However, when the targeting of civilians and the abuse of women is not
expressly forbidden by military and political leaders, and its perpetration is either
explicitly or implicitly encouraged, simply ignored, or, in some circumstances, even
ordered, the regularity and brutality of the crime increase exponentially. This is the
situation in most contemporary armed conflicts, including that in Darfur. Thus, while
the sexual violence committed in Darfur is horrific, sexual depravity is not unusual
during conflict situations, and sexual atrocities are not unique to Darfur. The
universal recognition that rape is epidemic in armed conflict, and has been from time
immemorial, puts all on notice, including leaders, about the frequent commission of
sexual violence.
Sexual Violence in Darfur
Many reports have documented atrocities in Darfur, and more than a dozen reports
documenting these crimes have focused exclusively on rape and other forms of sexual
violence, indicating its perceived gravity, its pervasiveness, and its need for redress.6
International and local human rights organizations, UN bodies and agencies, and
government agencies, monitors, and reporters have been among those expressing
alarm over the persistent episodes of sexual violence committed during attacks on
villages, while victims are in flight, and inside and outside IDP and refugee camps.
Nonetheless, because of significant underreporting of the crime (due largely to
discriminatory treatment of victims by law and society), the number of rapes
undoubtedly greatly exceeds even the high numbers already known. Male rapes and
other forms of sexual violence (especially mutilation) are increasingly reported and
also occur with far greater frequency than statistics indicate.
Sex crimes are almost always accompanied by other forms of violence or abuse,
such as beatings, forced nudity, enslavement, inhumane conditions, or destruction
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of homes, families, communities, and livelihoods. Many victims are killed after being
raped, but some are left alive, sometimes because many perpetrators consider rape
worse than death.7 Pregnancy and damage to reproductive health are also regular
features of rapes; self-induced abortions to terminate the pregnancies are not
uncommon.
In 2004, the United Nations appointed five independent commissioners to
investigate and report on the most serious crimes perpetrated in Darfur. The
Commission of Inquiry (COI) into crimes committed in Darfur released its report in
January 2005, concluding that atrocity crimes had been committed in all three states
of Darfur by both Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed militia. In summarizing
its conclusion on the crimes committed on a widespread and systematic basis
throughout Darfur, the report states as follows:
Based on a thorough analysis of the information gathered in the course of its
investigations, the Commission established that the Government of the Sudan and the
Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law. In particular, the
Commission found that Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate
attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of
villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement,
throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis,
and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.8
The COI Report outlines the most common patterns of rape crimes, which had been
previously documented and were then confirmed by the commissioners’ own
investigations:
First, deliberate aggressions against women and girls, including gang rapes, occurred
during the attacks on the villages. Second, women and girls were abducted, held in
confinement for several days and repeatedly raped during that time. Third, rape and
other forms of sexual violence continued during flight and further displacement,
including when women left towns and IDP sites to collect wood or water. In certain
areas, rapes also occurred inside towns. Some women and girls became pregnant as a
result of rape.9
As other reports similarly conclude, rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, and
pregnancy as a result of rape were recurring themes in attacks throughout hundreds
of villages in North, West, and South Darfur.
The most extensive documentation of crimes committed in Darfur, including sex
crimes, was collected by the Coalition for International Justice and US State
Department’s Atrocities Documentation Project in July and August 2004, during
which more than 1,100 interviews were conducted in refugee camps in Chad and in
several other unofficial makeshift camps just inside the Chad–Sudan border.10
Testimony of sexual violence obtained by the Atrocities Documentation Teams (ADT)
includes the following (names of villages are typically spelled phonetically; numbers in
parentheses are ADT interview numbers):11
 ‘‘In Western Darfur (near Beida) in June 2003, a Masaleit man saw the
Janjaweed cut out the stomachs of pregnant women. If the fetus was male, the
JJW [Janjaweed] hit the fetus against a tree; if female, the fetus was left in the
dirt. The witness stated his sister was [also] raped.’’ (41)
 ‘‘In Western Darfur (near Foro Borunga) in June 2003, a Fur man said his wife
was raped by seven GoS soldiers, and thirteen other women were also raped
during the attack. He saw horsemen take a baby from a woman’s back, tear off
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its clothes and slice its stomach; another woman’s baby daughter was smashed
against a tree and killed. He witnessed approximately twenty male and seven
female babies being killed.’’ (6)
 ‘‘A Fur woman fled an attack on her village in Darfur (near Bendesi) in August
2003. She witnessed a twelve-year-old girl being gang raped by five men; the
girl died soon after the attack. The witness also heard of many children being
abducted as slaves or cow-herders.’’ (4)
 ‘‘During an attack in West Darfur (near Gokor) in November 2003, a Masaleit
woman was among forty women captured and gang raped by seven soldiers
during an aerial and ground attack. Some males were also sexually assaulted.’’
(336)
 ‘‘A Masaleit woman in West Darfur (near Senena) in December 2003 said
twenty girls were captured by GoS and gang-raped (vaginally and anally) for
three days. Three girls had nails put in their vaginas (one of whom died), two
other girls had their vaginas sewn up, and five became pregnant from the rapes.
All were unmarried.’’ (491)
 ‘‘In West Darfur (near Genena) in December 2003, a Masaleit woman stated
that she and six other women were taken to a GoS base (Dongeta) where they
were held for three days and repeatedly gang raped (vaginally and anally,
sometimes with sticks) while tied naked and spread eagle. The witness saw the
bodies of three naked elderly women with foreign objects thrust in their
vaginas. She also said another woman told her she had been tied to a tree and
forced to watch her daughter being raped.’’ (497)
 ‘‘A Masaleit woman in West Darfur (near El Geneina) in February 2004 saw
GoS soldiers catch sixteen women with babies. They broke the baby boys’ necks
in front of the mothers and beat mothers with their own babies like whips until
the babies died.’’ (482)
 ‘‘In Northern Darfur (near Karnoi) in January 2004, a pregnant Zaghawan
woman and four girls (aged 12, 13, 15, 16) were abducted and raped by five to
six soldiers each night, until their release five days later.’’ (161)
 ‘‘A Zaghawa woman in North Darfur (near Karnoi) had her village attacked in
March 2004 and she and eight other women were abducted and raped. After a
month, an officer with two stars on his shoulder made the soldiers let the
women go.’’ (170)
The ADT interviewers also recorded testimony of epithets or slurs directed at the
victims during the course of the sexual assaults. Rape often lasts for long periods, and
the perpetrators tend to communicate some of the reasons behind the attacks. Some of
the rape testimony collected by the ADT that includes racial or gendered comments is
reproduced here:
 ‘‘During an aerial and ground attack on a village in North Darfur (near Karnoi)
in June 2003, a female Zaghawa survivor reported that she was told ‘we want to
kill the men and take the women to be our wives.’’’ (542)
 ‘‘During an attack in Western Darfur (near Masteri) in November 2003,
a Masaleit woman was raped by ten soldiers who said that the government ‘sent
them to kill and rape and clean their land.’’’ (287)
 ‘‘During a ground attack in Western Darfur (near Seleya) in November 2003, a
Eregnan man reported hearing ‘we will kill all men and rape women. We want
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to change the color. Every woman will deliver red. Arabs (will be) the husbands
of those women.’’’ (533)
 ‘‘During a village attack in Western Darfur (near Kruink) in November 2003, a
male Masaleit witness reported seeing twelve women raped and mutilated
(breasts and vaginas cut) by GoS and JJW, and being told ‘you have no country
here, you must leave and go to Chad.’’’ (325)
 ‘‘A Masaleit woman in West Darfur (near El Geneina) in December 2003 saw
Arabs take eight male babies by their feet and slam them into the ground until
they died; the JJW told women being raped: ‘We rape you to make a free baby,
not a slave like you!’’’ (489)
 ‘‘A Fur male reported that in December 2003, a few months before his village in
West Darfur (near El Geneina) was attacked, Janjaweed raped his daughter
and two other girls (ages 14, 15, 16) and said ‘We will take your women and
make them ours. We will change the race.’’’ (575)
 ‘‘During an attack on her village in Western Darfur (near Misterei) in January
2004, a Masaleit woman reported that she was one of sixteen women caught
and raped during an aerial/ground attack. She was raped by four soldiers.
Three other rapes she witnessed included having breasts slashed; two girls died
from the gang rapes. The attackers told her ‘if you like this stay in Sudan, if you
don’t, go to Chad.’’’ (259)
 ‘‘A Zaghawa woman in North Darfur (near Kotum) in March 2004 stated that
sixteen girls from her village were abducted and gang raped. A perpetrator said
‘From now and for twenty years we will kill all the blacks and all of the
Zaghawa tribe.’’’ (803)
 ‘‘A Masaleit woman in South Darfur (near Garsila) had her village attacked in
June 2004 by GoS and JJW. Despite being four months pregnant, she fled, but
was caught running by five men. They beat her with a whip, causing her to lose
her baby. The attackers said: ‘Black prostitute, whore—you are dirty blacks.’’’
(1056)
The incidents described above represent only a fraction of the reports of various
forms of sexual violence inflicted on the black indigenous population in Darfur, but
they demonstrate the consistency of the reasons behind the attacks, the regularity
with which rape crimes occur, and the calculated use of rape as an instrument to
terrorize and destroy the targeted group. The gendered nature of many attacks—
targeting fetuses or babies because of their sex and targeting some women because
of their reproductive capacity or pregnancy—should not be minimized. Time and again
interviewees told of black Darfuris being raped, raped in gangs or with foreign objects,
or having breasts, vaginas, or penises mutilated; pregnant women having their wombs
sliced open or women having their pregnancies forcibly aborted by beatings or other
abusive treatment; babies, particularly male babies, being murdered; women made
pregnant by the rapes; men and women forced into nudity; and women and girls being
abducted and sexually enslaved. Males are often targeted in armed conflicts because
they are viewed as the fighters or potential fighters; females are targeted because they
are viewed as the repositories of culture and the (re)producers of generations, or
simply as the gender intended to serve and service men. The form and nature of the
violence often reflects these attitudes.
In the most progressive societies, impediments to reporting, investigating,
and prosecuting rape still abound. In conservative and religious societies like Sudan,
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the obstacles multiply. In particular, as mentioned above, the misplaced shame and
stigma of rape crimes and revictimization by criminal justice systems cause this crime
to be underreported. When extremist laws or practices, such as the Islamic laws
operating in Darfur, require women or girls to prove a rape by the testimony of four
male witnesses and to be subjected to an insensitively or crudely conducted
government medical exam, there is little incentive, and many disincentives, to
reporting the crime. This is particularly true because the survivor may be
charged with zena (adultery or having sex outside of a marital relationship)
if she cannot prove the rape, especially if she is pregnant. Such a charge may
result in public whippings and imprisonment, perhaps even a death sentence.
At a minimum, it can result in the survivor’s being cast out of the community and
precluded from marrying. In addition, the dysfunctional and discriminatory court
system in Darfur—not to mention the fact that the courts are controlled by the
government, which is considered responsible for the atrocities—further reduces
reporting of sex crimes.12
Rape as Genocide and a Crime against Humanity
Since the mid-1990s, many articles and books have focused on how rape and other
forms of sexual violence can be and have been prosecuted as war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide.13 Crimes include rape, enslavement, sexual slavery,
torture, persecution, mutilation, enforced sterilization, forced pregnancy, forced
abortion, forced nudity, sexual humiliation, forced marriage, cruel treatment, and
inhumane acts, some of which are explicitly listed in the International Criminal Court
(ICC) Statute, while others are implicitly covered under the statute’s ‘‘or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’’ language.14 Judgments in the Yugoslav
Tribunal (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY) and
the Rwanda Tribunal (the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR) have
also convicted individuals of rape as crimes against humanity and instruments of
genocide.15 Because, as noted above, there is already a plethora of information
available on how gender-related crimes can be successfully prosecuted, these issues
will be given only cursory treatment here.
The ICC can prosecute gender-related crimes under articles 6 (genocide), 7 (crimes
against humanity), and 8 (war crimes) of the ICC Statute. The gender crimes
specifically enumerated in the statute are rape, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence of
comparable gravity. Additionally, gender persecution and trafficking of women and
children are also explicitly referred to in the statute.16
Under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG) and the ICC Statute, ‘‘genocide’’ means any of the acts listed in
article II, sub-paragraphs (a)–(e), committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such. The five prohibited acts are as
follows:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
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‘‘Killing members of a group,’’ prohibited in (a), is undoubtedly the most widely
recognized means of committing genocide, although all five sub-articles are equally
prohibited. The other sub-articles do not necessarily involve death, or even outright
violence, as a means of destroying a group. Rape as an instrument of genocide most
often invokes sub-articles (b), intending to destroy a protected group by ‘‘causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of that group,’’ and (d), ‘‘imposing measures
intended to prevent births within a group.’’17 As noted above, rape, along with torture
and enslavement, including sexual torture and sexual slavery, regularly takes longer
to commit than other crimes, and the extended time and close proximity of the
perpotrator and the victim often prompt statements by the perpetrator(s) that can be
useful in discerning genocidal intent. The Akayesu Judgment of the Rwanda Tribunal
is the seminal decision recognizing rape as an instrument of genocide.
The ICTY and ICTR have also convicted persons for rape as a crime against
humanity when the crimes formed part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population. It is the attack that must be either widespread or
systematic, not the rapes, although rape itself is frequently both widespread and
systematic. The phrase ‘‘systematic rape’’ does not mean that each rape is meticulously
organized and planned; it refers, among other things, to a plan or policy to sexually
abuse women, which is often carried out by implicitly or explicitly encouraging or
granting free rein to commit the crime.
There is every indication that the official policy of the GoS and Janjaweed forces is
to wage, jointly or separately, concentrated and strategic attacks against black
Darfuris by a variety of means, including killing, raping, pillaging, burning, and
displacement. Various forms of sexual violence have consistently formed part of
these attacks. As emphasized by the COI report, ‘‘The findings of the Commission
confirm that rape and sexual abuse were perpetrated during attacks by Janjaweed
and soldiers. This included the joint attacks by Government soldiers and
Janjaweed attacks.’’18 BBC News reported the following regarding the attack of one
village: ‘‘More than 100 women have been raped in a single attack carried out by Arab
militias in Darfur in Western Sudan.. . . Another 150 women . . . have been abducted.’’19
Rape crimes have been documented in dozens of villages throughout Darfur and
committed in similar patterns, indicating that rape itself is both widespread and
systematic.
The information available on crimes in Darfur suggests that the ICC can
prosecute rape as a crime against humanity and an instrument of genocide and that
other forms of sexual violence, particularly forced pregnancy, sexual mutilation, and
sexual slavery, are also common prosecutable forms of attack and destruction in
Darfur.
Individual and Superior Responsibility
The ICC can prosecute both physical perpetrators and others responsible for sexual
violence, including civil and military leaders and others who ordered, instigated, aided,
abetted, or otherwise facilitated the crimes (individual responsibility), or who knew or
had reason to know about crimes committed by subordinates under their control
but failed to prevent, halt, or punish the crimes (superior responsibility). In most
situations, the persons most responsible for orchestrating war and the atrocities
committed therein are not the physical perpetrators or even those physically present
at the crime sites, unless they are military/militia leaders. More specifically, in the ICC
Statute, individual criminal responsibility grants the court jurisdiction over persons
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who commit a crime, individually or jointly; who order, solicit, or induce a crime; or
who aid, abet, assist, or otherwise facilitate a crime. Participating in a common
criminal purpose may also incur individual criminal responsibility.20 Command and
superior responsibility is invoked (1) for military leaders and other superiors who
knew or should have known of crimes, or consciously disregarded information about
them; and (2) where the crimes were committed by subordinates under their effective
responsibility/authority/command and control, and they failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the crimes or to
report the crimes to the relevant competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.21
In the jurisprudence of the World War II trials, as well as the ICTY and the ICTR,
and as incorporated in the ICC Statute,22 crimes may be punished under the joint
criminal enterprise (JCE) theory of responsibility (also known as the common purpose
doctrine). Essentially, a JCE is considered a form of commission, a form of individual
criminal responsibility. A JCE is composed of a plurality of persons participating in
some way (through assistance or other contribution) in a common plan/design/purpose
that amounts to or involves a crime within the jurisdiction of the court. The common
plan can be agreed upon in advance, can materialize extemporaneously, and can be
inferred from the facts.23
The ICTY has identified three distinct, but often overlapping, forms of JCE: JCE I
is the basic form, in which all co-defendants share the same criminal intent or goal;
they knowingly participate in some way and intend the result. JCE II is the systemic
form. It is a subset of JCE I and has primarily been applied to concentration camps
or situations where there is an orchestrated campaign of persecution or oppression.
In JCE II, there is an organized system of ill treatment, and defendants have
awareness of the nature of the system and an intent to further that system. There
is some form of participation in the system, but their participation does not have to
be significant. JCE III is the extended form, whereby responsibility for crimes
committed beyond the common plan can be incurred. This happens when a
perpetrator—not necessarily the defendant—commits a crime outside the common
purpose, but the act is a natural or foreseeable consequence of the criminal endeavor.
Here, a defendant willingly takes a risk that additional predictable crimes will
be committed. The various forms may, and often do, overlap or occur parallel to
each other.24
In a culture of mass atrocity, it may sometimes be difficult to determine which
crimes were part of the agreed-upon enterprise and which were outside the scope of the
intended crimes but nonetheless foreseeable. But in most situations of mass violence
and oppression, rape and other common forms of sexual violence will not be mere
foreseeable consequences; rather, they should be considered integral parts of the
destruction, of the physical and mental violence intentionally inflicted on the targeted
group. The fear and terror inflicted by sexual violence rivals, and sometimes exceeds,
that of murder; it is a crime calculated to inflict maximum harm on the targeted group.
Treating sex crimes as simply foreseeable (JCE III) but killing, beating, torturing, and
burning as intended (JCE I) or part of a system of ill treatment (JCE II) would distort
the historical record and ignore the gravity and potency of the crimes. Thus, rape
crimes should be prosecuted under JCE I and II, with JCE III rape prosecutions
restricted to situations in which the joint criminal plan was very specific (e.g.,
summary execution of all boys over thirteen years of age in a village) and the rapes
that occur are truly not planned but are nonetheless foreseeable.25
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In Darfur, the evidence suggests that GoS political and military leaders
participated in a joint criminal enterprise with their Janjaweed collaborators, whom
the GoS armed, supplied, and directed for at least the first two years. Initially, many
attacks were joint GoS and Janjaweed attacks, until virtually all black African villages
had been attacked; after that, the GoS appears to have largely left it to the Janjaweed
and regular bandits to complete the destruction on the ground. From February 2003 to
March 2005, in particular, a common mode of attack in Darfur was for a GoS plane or
helicopter to bypass Arab villages and carry out an attack (or surveillance) on black
villages, in concert with or followed by ground attacks by government forces or
government-supported Janjaweed militia. During the course of these attacks, civilian
huts were destroyed; men, women, and children killed; women and girls raped;
animals and other property stolen; child cattle herders and others abducted; and
survivors forced into the inhospitable desert.
Aerial and ground attacks also commonly targeted life sources, such as water and
food supplies, shelter, arable land, crops, livestock, and medical supplies.26 In the
context of Darfur, with temperatures soaring to 1308F in the harsh desert environment
during the day but dropping dramatically some nights, such destruction was especially
effective and quite naturally resulted in death and illness. Starvation, dehydration,
exposure, infection, and disease were intended results of the intentional destruction of
life sources and forced displacement.
The ad hoc tribunals have refined but not significantly developed the concept of
command/superior responsibility beyond that promulgated by the post–World War II
trials; most indictees in the Yugoslav (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) Tribunals have been
found guilty of individual responsibility. Indeed, the courts have found not only that
many leaders regularly failed in their duty to prevent or punish crimes committed by
subordinates but, more egregiously, incurred individual responsibility for facilitating
the commission of the crimes. As might be expected, leaders who orchestrate,
authorize, condone, encourage, or otherwise assist criminal activity do not then tend to
endeavor to stop the crimes they have orchestrated or to punish those who committed
the crimes they themselves have authorized. Therefore, the ICTY and ICTR have
tended to either convict on individual responsibility and dismiss the superior
responsibility charges or find that the superior responsibility crimes were subsumed
within the crimes incurring individual responsibility. Thus, the notion seems to be that
if one orders a crime, one should not also be held responsible for failing to punish the
subordinate who carried out one’s orders.
Ignoring crimes committed by subordinates initially might fall under superior
responsibility, failure to act. But when the silence continues, a potent message is sent
to subordinates that superiors do not disapprove of their crimes, and this signals tacit
approval, invoking individual responsibility. Additionally, JCE, being a form of
commission, is a form of individual responsibility, not superior responsibility. Still,
when there is insufficient evidence available to prove that a leader participated in a
JCE or facilitated the commission of a crime, holding him (or her) responsible for his
duty to prevent or punish crimes committed by the de facto or de jure subordinates
under his command and control remains a viable option.
The ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has consistently stated that his office
intends to focus on leaders bearing the greatest responsibility for the most serious
crimes. For Sudan, then, the ICC will likely indict less than a dozen civil and military
leaders (including those of the Janjaweed/militia) for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and possibly genocide in Darfur. There is little dispute that war crimes and
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crimes against humanity, including sex crimes, have been committed. Many genocide
experts have concluded that genocide has also been committed in Darfur.27 The COI
Report unconvincingly reached a different conclusion, leading the government of
Sudan to imply that the commission had exonerated it of all serious criminal activity.
The US government has called the crimes in Darfur a genocide and, despite its
hostility to the ICC, did not veto a Security Council resolution referring the situation
in Darfur to the ICC.28
Holding Leaders Accountable for Sex Crimes
As noted above, the ICC has indicated that it intends to focus principally on
investigating those holding the highest level of responsibility for justiciable crimes.
Leaders have a duty to protect the civilian population and provide justice to those who
have been victims of crimes. In Darfur, government leaders have not only failed in this
duty but are also implicated in committing or otherwise facilitating the atrocities. In
Kvocka, the ICTY Trial Chamber emphasized that special measures need to be taken
to ensure that women placed in vulnerable positions during armed conflict are
protected from sexual violence. It further noted that once they have reports or
knowledge of such crimes, persons in positions of authority are placed on notice; to
prevent being held accountable, they must take extra measures to prevent sex
crimes.29 Even if one took the dubious view that consistent reports of rape crimes
in conflicts throughout the world over the past thousand years, not to mention the
explosion of rape reports filed during wars over the last decade, did not put leaders on
notice that sexual assaults are a common means of destroying a community or harming
a targeted group, the recurring monthly reports of rape crimes in Darfur certainly did
put the political and military leaders in Sudan on notice that rape was a frequent
occurrence there. Reports by the United Nations, of which Sudan is a member, also
highlight the prevalence of rape and raise it as a grave concern.
A wide range of UN experts has repeatedly noted that rape crimes flourish in
Darfur with the full knowledge of the government. For example, Louise Arbour, the
UN’s high commissioner for human rights and the former chief prosecutor of the ICTY
and ICTR, as well as a former member of the Supreme Court of Canada, has stressed
that ‘‘there is a credible base of evidence that there is a severe, severe, serious amount
of sexual violence that is not being properly addressed.’’30 On 21 June 2005, Jan
Egeland, the UN undersecretary for humanitarian affairs, reported that ‘‘in Darfur,
rape is systematically used as a weapon of warfare.’’31 In March 2004, Mukesh Kapila,
the UN coordinator for Sudan, discussing the mass rape committed in Darfur,
emphasized that ‘‘it is more than just a conflict. It is an organized attempt to do away
with a group of people.’’32 Sima Samar, UN special rapporteur for human rights in
Sudan, has stated that ‘‘gender-based violence continues unfortunately with impunity’’
and that the government’s excuses were unacceptable.33 And Juan Mendez, UN special
advisor to the secretary-general on the prevention of genocide, emphasized that even
by September 2005, ‘‘the rape of women remained too prevalent.’’34
It is relatively straightforward to hold persons criminally responsible for sex
crimes when they commit them physically, directly order the crimes (and there is
documentation or other evidence), or are physically present at crime sites and either
encourage or otherwise aid and abet the crimes. As noted above, it is also largely
accepted that the most culpable government and military leaders do not have to be
physically present at crime sites to be held accountable for the policies they have
dictated in directing a widespread or systematic attack against a targeted civilian
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group. Nonetheless, when attacks on village after village involve murder, torture,
rape, pillage, and forced displacement, in prosecutions, all but the sex crimes will
typically be attributed to the leaders as part of their official policy.
While in theory it should not be particularly complicated to hold political/civilian or
military leaders criminally responsible, either as individuals or as superiors, for sexual
violence when the crimes are widespread or systematic, not to mention notorious,
in practice there has been enormous reluctance to hold leaders and non-physical
perpetrators accountable for sex crimes, as opposed to other crimes. In general, the
attitude seems to be that leaders need not be physically present at crime sites to be
held responsible for the carnage that ensues during the course of carrying out a plan or
policy to harm the targeted group, whereas sex crimes are regularly treated by
investigators, prosecutors, and judges as different, private, or special crimes, outside
the scope of any intended attack. The notion—held by many investigators, prosecutors,
trial attorneys, and judges—appears to be that leaders should not be held accountable
for sex crimes unless there is incontrovertible proof that they ordered the crimes or
that they knew about them and personally intended their commission. This attitude is
not only legally and factually inaccurate, it is morally untenable, provides a flawed,
sexist historical record of the events, and denies justice to half the population. Failing
to hold leaders accountable for sex crimes when they occur regularly and consistently
over weeks and months, let alone years, suggests that the crimes are not considered
serious or are deemed personal/private issues. It also ignores consistent and credible
reports that wartime rapes are used strategically as weapons of war or instruments of
terror.
That said, the ICTY has recognized that leaders can be held accountable for sex
crimes when they neither were present nor ordered the crimes. For example, in the
Plavsic case before the ICTY, Biljana Plavsic, a former leader of the Bosnian Serb
entity, pled guilty to one count of persecution as a crime against humanity in exchange
for dropping the other seven charges, including the genocide counts. To accept a guilty
plea, the chamber had to be satisfied that the guilty plea was informed, voluntary, and
unequivocal and that there was a sufficient factual basis that the crimes were
committed and that the person pleading guilty participated in them. Plavsic’s guilty
plea on the charge of persecution as a crime against humanity, accepted by the
tribunal, included acknowledging responsibility for rape crimes.35 The persecution
count accused Plavsic of participating in a joint criminal enterprise to plan, instigate,
order, and aid or abet the persecution of non-Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The means
of persecution included killing, raping, torturing, forcibly displacing, and committing
other inhumane acts against civilians and destroying civilian property. Accepting the
guilty plea and convicting Plavsic of persecution as a crime against humanity, the
chamber noted that she was neither as influential nor as powerful as many other
leaders, and played a lesser role in facilitating the crimes. Nonetheless, she incurred
responsibility for rape and other crimes by acquiescing in them. As Plavsic herself
stated, ‘‘although I was repeatedly informed of allegations of cruel and inhuman
conduct against non-Serbs, I refused to accept them or even to investigate.’’36 She thus
bore individual responsibility for the crimes, being a leader who knowingly
participated in a joint criminal endeavor to persecute non-Serbs. She may not have
specifically intended the rapes, but nonetheless she had knowledge of them and made
no effort to indicate disapproval, to complain, or to initiate preventive measures, thus
incurring individual responsibility for the crimes.37
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To be sure, the orchestraters of mass atrocity in Darfur know what is happening on
the ground and receive full and detailed reports of events. The political, military, and
militia leaders have no doubt that when they order an attack, the ensuing violence will
take many diverse forms, including rape. In the extraordinary event that they were so
naı¨ve that they did not know initially, they certainly knew after reports were issued,
and still the leaders have continued urging or ignoring unlawful attacks on civilians
with full knowledge that rape—and other crimes—would form part of the attacks.
The government of Sudan has not made a secret of its intent to refuse to cooperate
with the ICC, including denying visas to ICC investigators and prosecutors seeking to
enter the country. Thus there will be some difficulty in investigating crimes within
Darfur itself, at least until Sudan is forced or induced to cooperate with the court.
Nevertheless, refugees who are victims of and witnesses to crimes in Darfur are in
dozens of countries around the world—more than 200,000 in Chad alone—and many
would undoubtedly be willing to give evidence to the ICC. States parties to the ICC—
100 countries, as of November 2005—are required by the ICC Statute to cooperate with
the court, and many of these countries have valuable intelligence information on
evidence of crimes and the most culpable parties. The UN Security Council, the African
Union, the European Union, UN bodies and agencies, and non-governmental
organizations can also play a positive role in assisting the court. The obstacles
confronting the ICC are many, but with perseverance, integrity, and creativity, the
challenges can be overcome and the people of Darfur can receive some measure of
justice for the atrocities committed against them.
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A New Chapter of Irony: The Legal
Implications of the Darfur Genocide
Determination
Jerry Fowler
Committee on Conscience, United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum1
US Secretary of State Colin Powell determined that genocide as defined in the UN
Genocide Convention had occurred in Darfur, but he disclaimed any new
obligations as a result of that determination. Under the permissive provisions of
Article 8 of the convention, he called upon the UN Security Council to investigate
whether genocide or other crimes were being committed, with a view to
accountability. The subsequent investigation by a UN Commission of Inquiry
concluded, on rather dubious grounds, that the Sudanese government was not
responsible for genocide but recommended referral of the situation to the
International Criminal Court for purposes of accountability; ironically, the
opposite conclusions of Powell and the UN Commission produced the same
result: a call for steps toward accountability. A further irony is that the UN
Convention, although articulating an international condemnation of the crime of
genocide, compels nothing more. The attempts at the September 2005 World
Summit to obtain recognition of an international responsibility to protect under-
scored the fundamental reality that nations will not act decisively to confront
genocide and other massive human rights abuses out of a sense of legal obligation,
but only as a matter of political and practical necessity.
Legal scholar Diane Orentlicher once observed that the United Nations Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) ‘‘has come to
embody the conscience of humanity.’’2 She then acidly remarked that the convention’s
‘‘moral force is surely ironic,’’ in light of the persistent failure of governments to enforce
its terms.3 Darfur adds another sad chapter of irony in the convention’s history, given
the dramatic incongruity between the sense of urgency that one might expect a
plausible case of ongoing genocide to engender and the relatively lackadaisical
international political response that has in fact unfolded. As it turns out, this irony is
embedded in the provisions of the UNCG itself. After calling for international
cooperation ‘‘to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge,’’ the convention
proceeds to define the crime of genocide in terms that, from the perspective of
‘‘preventing’’ or ‘‘suppressing’’ genocide, are problematic. It then offers only the vaguest
sense of what should be done when genocide is imminent or actually under way.
‘‘To Liberate Mankind from Such an Odious Scourge’’
Though there are examples of mass violence directed against identifiable groups
dating back to antiquity, ‘‘genocide’’ as a term and a concept has a quite recent origin.
Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish lawyer who fled Poland after the German invasion in 1939,
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coined the word and introduced it in 1944.4 He derived it from the Greek for tribe
or nation (geno-) and the Latin for killing (-cide). By ‘‘genocide,’’ Lemkin meant
‘‘a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves.’’5
In no small part due to the efforts of Lemkin himself, his new word soon gained
currency.6 It was mentioned in the 1945 Nuremberg indictment as a description of war
crimes committed by the defendants being tried before the International Military
Tribunal.7 In December 1946, the General Assembly of the newly created United
Nations adopted a resolution that described genocide as ‘‘a denial of the right of
existence of entire human groups’’ that ‘‘shocks the conscience of mankind’’ and
‘‘affirm[ed]’’ that genocide is ‘‘crime under international law.’’8
That resolution also set in motion the process that resulted in the adoption of
the UNCG on 9 December 1948.9 The convention itself is rather a spare document—
nineteen articles, of which the last nine are more technical than substantive, dealing
with matters such as where states that become parties to the convention shall deposit
their instruments of ratification or accession (with the secretary-general of the United
Nations); how many states must become parties before the convention comes into force
(twenty, a number reached in late 1950); and where the original copy of the convention
would be held (in the UN archives).
The convention’s preamble invokes ‘‘international law’’ and ‘‘the spirit and aims of
the United Nations,’’ as well as the condemnation of genocide ‘‘by the civilized world.’’
It echoes the General Assembly’s view that international cooperation is necessary
to free humanity from the ‘‘odious scourge’’ of genocide. To that end, Article I specifies
that ‘‘genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which [the Contracting Parties] undertake to prevent and to
punish.’’
The heart of the substantive portion of the convention is Article II, which defines
genocide as a matter of international law. The definition has two essential components:
a specified physical act (what lawyers would call the actus reus) and a particular state
of mind (technically, a mens rea). The specified acts cannot constitute genocide unless
they are committed with the requisite state of mind.
The specified acts are the following:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
The required state of mind—which distinguishes genocide from any other crime—
is the ‘‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such.’’ Thus, merely intending to commit the specified acts is not enough. The
perpetrators must also have a ‘‘specific’’ or ‘‘special’’ intent to destroy a protected group
in whole or in part.10 Establishing the subjective intent harbored in the minds of
perpetrators can present vexing issues of proof, especially when events are unfolding
in some inaccessible location. As discussed more fully below, the circumstances
surrounding the commission of specific acts can provide evidence of the intent with
which those acts are committed.
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Several articles flesh out the central idea that genocide is an international crime,
and therefore punishable. Article III explains that not only genocide itself but also
‘‘conspiracy to commit genocide,’’ ‘‘direct and public incitement to commit genocide,’’
‘‘attempt to commit genocide,’’ and ‘‘complicity in genocide’’ can be punished. According
to Article IV, perpetrators are subject to punishment without regard to their status as
‘‘constitutionally responsible rulers’’ or holders of some other public office. In Article V,
the parties ‘‘undertake’’ to pass whatever domestic legislation might be necessary to
give effect to the terms of the convention, specifically emphasizing punishment for
genocide and the other crimes listed in Article III. For good measure, Article VI adds
an unspecified ‘‘international penal tribunal’’11 as a possible venue for trying those
accused of genocide, in addition to courts in the territory where the criminal acts were
committed.12 Article VII addresses the extradition of accused perpetrators from one
country in order to stand trial in another.
As terse as are the provisions related to punishment of genocide, the convention’s
other avowed goal—that of genocide prevention—gets even shorter shrift. Article VIII
merely states that a party to the convention ‘‘may call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as
they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide’’
(emphasis added). Tossing the ball into the UN’s court, in other words, is permitted but
not required.
No other article refers to prevention, except for Article I’s rather ambiguous
statement that parties to the convention ‘‘undertake to prevent’’ genocide. Exactly
what obligation this language imposes is not clear. Particularly opaque is whether the
undertaking to prevent genocide is directed at a state’s own territory or territory under
its control or whether it imposes some duty on parties to act wherever in the world
genocide might be threatened or occur. Some scholars have asserted the latter.13 Yet
the language of the convention does not give any indication that such an extensive
obligation was contemplated. Indeed, it would be quite bizarre to think that the
drafters intended in 1948 to make intervention in the internal affairs of other states
obligatory for individual states or groups of states (through the broad interpretation of
Article I), while recourse to the United Nations is merely optional (under the plain
terms of Article VIII). Such a scheme diverges wildly from the structure for
maintaining international peace and security established just three years earlier
with the adoption of the UN Charter and the creation of the United Nations itself.
And in the almost six decades since the adoption of the UNCG, there is scant evidence
of state practice evincing a sense of obligation to prevent or suppress genocide in other
countries pursuant to Article I. When Bosnia argued before the International Court of
Justice that all parties to the UNCG had a duty under Article I to prevent genocide
against it and its citizens, the ad hoc judge appointed by Bosnia itself could only
observe, rather morosely, that ‘‘the limited reaction of the parties to the Genocide
Convention in relation [to past episodes of apparent genocide] may represent a practice
suggesting the permissibility of inactivity.’’14 Likewise, the May 1994 internal State
Department memorandum to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher recommend-
ing that the United States begin to use the word ‘‘genocide’’ in relation to Rwanda
noted that such a move ‘‘would not have any particular legal consequences.’’15
Is, Is Not
The UNCG provided the framework within which US Secretary of State Colin Powell
and the United States government considered, in mid-2004, the question of whether
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genocide was occurring in Darfur. Applying Article II’s legal definition to the facts
gathered by the Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT) and from other sources, they
concluded that genocide had been committed and that the government of Sudan and its
militia allies—the so-called Janjaweed—were responsible.16
In announcing his determination, Secretary Powell pointed to murder, rape, and
other physical violence committed against members of non-Arab ethnic groups. This
violence corresponded with the acts specified in Article II (a) and (b) of the UNCG—
killing members of a group and causing serious bodily or mental harm to them. He also
pointed to the destruction of foodstuffs and other means of survival of the targeted
groups, coupled with obstruction by the Sudanese government of the humanitarian
assistance that the victims needed in order to survive. This conduct, which itself
inflicted a large number of deaths on the targeted population in addition to those
caused by direct violence, corresponded with article II(c)—deliberately inflicting
conditions of life calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction, in whole
or in part.
As for the ‘‘intent to destroy’’ required by Article II, Powell concluded that intent
could be inferred from the Sudanese government’s deliberate conduct. Inferring intent
from conduct in the absence of direct evidence is widely accepted. The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), for example, has listed a number of
circumstances that are relevant to determining ‘‘intent to destroy,’’ many of which
are present in the case of Darfur: ‘‘the general context of the perpetration of other
culpable acts systematically directed against that same group’’; ‘‘the scale of atrocities
committed’’; the ‘‘general nature’’ of the atrocities; deliberately and systematically
targeting members of some groups but not others; attacks on (or perceived by the
perpetrators to be attacks on) ‘‘the foundation of the group’’; ‘‘the use of derogatory
language toward members of the targeted group’’; ‘‘the systematic manner of killing’’;
and ‘‘the relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of
a group.’’17
In this regard, Powell’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
emphasized the scale and scope of the murder and rape of civilians as well as the fact
that the actions of the Sudanese military and its militia allies were ‘‘a coordinated
effort, not just random violence.’’18 Additionally, in the report released along with the
testimony, the ADT’s investigation documented substantial use of racial epithets and
derogatory language directed against members of non-Arab ethnic groups in
conjunction with violence.19 Powell also noted Khartoum’s failure to cease and desist
from the attacks on non-Arab groups and its continued obstruction of humanitarian
aid even after having been repeatedly put on notice by other governments and by the
United Nations.
Invoking Article VIII of the UNCG, Powell called upon the United Nations to
undertake its own investigation. Thus, the only specific outcome of the genocide
determination was the September 18 passage by the UN Security Council of Resolution
1564, which requested that the UN secretary-general appoint an International
Commission of Inquiry to look into whether acts of genocide had in fact occurred and to
identify perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law. While awaiting the commission’s report, the Security Council decided ‘‘to remain
seized of the matter.’’
At the end of January 2005, the commission issued its report, which documented
the Sudanese government’s role in organizing, arming, and training the Janjaweed
militia. Page after page of the voluminous report laid responsibility for serious
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violations of international humanitarian and human rights law at the government’s
doorstep. The commission concluded that the government and its allies bore primary
responsibility for massive violence against civilians that had a pronounced ethnic
dimension. Addressing the particular terms of the UNCG, the commission noted that
its investigation
collected substantial and reliable material which tends to show the occurrence of
systematic killing of civilians belonging to particular tribes, of large-scale causing of
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the population belonging to certain tribes,
and of massive and deliberate infliction on those tribes of conditions of life bringing
about their physical destruction in whole or in part (for example by systematically
destroying their villages and crops, by expelling them from their homes, and by looting
their cattle).20
The commission believed that this evidence could establish the physical acts
enumerated in Article II(a)–(c).21
But then the Commission explicitly ‘‘conclude[d] that the Government of Sudan
has not pursued a policy of genocide’’ based on the absence of the required ‘‘intent to
destroy.’’22 Although the commission’s report acknowledges that the scale of the
atrocities, the systematic nature of the atrocities, and racially motivated statements by
perpetrators indicated genocidal intent, it asserts that ‘‘other more indicative
elements’’ pointed to a lack of intent. The commission identifies three elements
supposed to be ‘‘more indicative.’’23
First, in some unspecified number of villages, the attackers ‘‘refrained from
exterminating the whole population.’’24 As evidence, the commission refers to one
group of villages in which the government commissioner and the leader of the Arab
militias executed about 227 of some 1,200 people who were captured after the attack.
Apparently, fifteen of the executed were on a written list brought by the perpetrators,
seven were village leaders (omdas), and 205 were accused of being rebels. The
commission’s reference to the fact that the perpetrators did not ‘‘exterminat[e] the
whole population’’ is puzzling. The plain language of the convention includes an intent
to destroy a group ‘‘in part.’’ The commission itself explains in a previous paragraph
that international case law establishes that ‘‘the intent to destroy a group ‘in part’
requires the intention to destroy a ‘considerable number of individuals’ or
‘a substantial part,’ but not necessarily a ‘very important part of the group.’’’25 The
commission fails to offer any reason why 227 out of 1,200 is neither a ‘‘considerable
number of individuals’’ (in relation to that sample) nor ‘‘a substantial part’’ of that
sample, especially when the community leadership was particularly targeted.
Moreover, it seems to take at face value the perpetrators’ reported assertion that
the 205 murdered villagers were rebels, leading the comission to distinguish between
‘‘the intent . . . to destroy an ethnic group as such’’ and ‘‘the intention to murder all
those men they considered to be rebels.’’ Yet, on just the previous page, the commission
quotes a number of utterances in which the perpetrators used ethnic identity, racial
epithets, and terms such as Torabora (slang for ‘‘rebels’’) interchangeably.26 The whole
point of the government’s campaign against the civilian population of non-Arab ethnic
groups was equating ethnicity with rebellion, rendering it nonsensical to distinguish
an intent to destroy those ethnic groups from an intent to murder rebels. The targets
were, by the Sudanese government’s apparent definition, one and the same.27
The second element cited by the commission as indicating a lack of genocidal intent
is that the Sudanese government collects survivors of destroyed villages in camps for
internally displaced persons (IDPs), where it ‘‘generally allows humanitarian
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organizations to help the population . . . by providing food, clean water, medicines and
logistical assistance.’’28 This element begs the question of whether the direct violence
(i.e., murdering and raping) was of sufficient scale to evince the intent to destroy the
targeted groups ‘‘in part,’’ even though there are survivors who were not murdered
outright. And the commission offers no rationale explaining why this element should
be more indicative of intent than the scale and systematic nature of direct violence. It
also skirts the issues of government obstacles to humanitarian aid, which were
reduced but not eliminated by concerted international pressure in mid-2004;
continuing elevated mortality rates in these camps; and continuing attacks (meaning
murder and rape) against those who venture out of the camps in search of essentials of
life such as firewood, water, or food.
The third element identified by the commission is that some unspecified number of
villages with a mixed ethnic composition had not been attacked at the time the
commission was undertaking its investigation. It is difficult to know what to make of
this assertion as the commission makes no effort to contextualize it. For example,
it does not quantify the number of untouched villages in relation to the number of
villages destroyed, or by relating the number of inhabitants of such villages to the
number of civilians who were subject to murder, rape, or displacement. Just as
importantly, previously unharmed villages were being attacked and destroyed during
the time that the commission was researching and writing its report.29
The commission’s final paragraph of analysis regarding intent is perhaps the most
difficult to fathom. It recounts a single anecdote from ‘‘a reliable source’’ in which one
man was not killed when ‘‘attackers’’—there is no identification of these attackers—
took 200 camels from him. By contrast, the man’s younger brother resisted the theft
of his one camel and was shot dead. ‘‘Clearly,’’ the commission concludes, ‘‘in this
instance the special intent to kill a member of a group to destroy the group as such was
lacking, the murder being only motivated by the desire to appropriate cattle belonging
to the inhabitants of the village.’’30 Perhaps the requisite intent was indeed missing in
that one instance. But the relationship of that one instance to the overall situation—in
which ‘‘pillaging and destruction . . . appears to have been directed to bring about the
destruction of the livelihoods and means of survival of’’ the targeted populations31—is
a mystery.
Weighing the Evidence
Although Powell and the UN’s Commission of Inquiry operated from a largely similar
factual base, they reached diametrically opposite conclusions on the question of
genocide. One explanation for this may be an issue that neither addressed explicitly:
the weight of evidence necessary to reach a conclusion. In these circumstances, how
much evidence of genocidal intent—in terms of quality and credibility—is necessary
relative to evidence of a lack of intent?
The commission hints that it applied an extremely high standard in assessing the
evidence. ‘‘Courts and other bodies charged with establishing whether genocide has
occurred,’’ the report notes, ‘‘must however be very careful in the determination of
subjective intent.’’32 It then approvingly quotes the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia for the proposition that ‘‘[c]onvictions for genocide can be
entered only where intent has been unequivocally established.’’33 In essence, the
commission adopted for itself the standard that intent must be shown ‘‘beyond
reasonable doubt’’—the weight of evidence necessary to convict an individual in a
criminal trial.34 This is the most exacting burden imaginable—an understandable
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burden for a prosecutor to bear when a court is deciding the life or liberty of
an individual.
Viewed in the context of this burden, the commission’s analysis on the issue of
genocidal intent is less mysterious. The three ‘‘elements’’ it cites, though not
particularly compelling, do cast some doubt on the existence of a genocidal intent on
the part of the Sudanese government. One might well conclude that the evidence of
genocidal intent that is adduced in the commission’s report, though quite strong, does
not establish such intent ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt.’’
But this standard is clearly wrong under these circumstances. The commission
was not a court of law, nor was it adjudicating the fate of individual defendants. The
liberty of an accused defendant did not turn on its decision. Quite to the contrary,
the commission was called upon only to make a threshold finding on the basis of which
the UN Security Council would decide whether to take additional action, including
referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for a full-fledged
criminal investigation.
A review of the ICC Statute makes clear the commission’s error in applying the
‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ standard. The statute contemplates several stages through
which a case proceeds, each requiring that a separate weight of evidence be met. When
a situation is referred to the ICC, the prosecutor is required to initiate an investigation
unless ‘‘there is no reasonable basis to proceed.’’35 Having conducted an investigation,
the prosecutor may seek an arrest warrant if he or she can establish ‘‘reasonable
grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court.’’36 The court is next called upon to confirm the charges, which it will do if the
prosecutor offers ‘‘sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that
the person committed the crime charged.’’37 Finally, at trial, an individual can only be
convicted if the court is ‘‘convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.’’38
Between ‘‘no reasonable basis to proceed’’ and ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ lies a
continuum along which the required weight of evidence steadily, and appropriately,
mounts as the process moves forward. To eliminate that continuum and require a
prosecutor to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a condition of launching an
investigation would be nonsensical. Yet that is the standard of proof apparently
applied by the commission, in spite of the fact that its investigation was prefatory to
any judicial action. The commission’s application of this standard is all the more
erroneous in light of the constraints placed upon it by the amount of time available,39
as well as the continued perpetration of the very crimes it was supposed to investigate.
It was not in any conceivable position to reach a conclusion ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’
on an issue as complex and problematic as genocidal intent.
As previously mentioned, Powell did not articulate what weight of evidence he
looked for in making his determination. But the tenor of his analysis, which
emphasized the necessarily limited nature of the ADT investigation and other
information available, suggests that he was, in essence, asserting a reasonable basis
for concluding that the Sudanese government and its Janjaweed allies had committed
genocide. The additional facts established by the commission confirm the existence of
that reasonable basis.
Politics, Not Law
If a determination of genocide is to be a predicate for further action—whether the
launching of a judicial investigation or the launching of humanitarian intervention or
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anything else—the weight of evidence necessary to support that finding cannot be
‘‘beyond reasonable doubt.’’ That level of evidence will simply not be available until
those in danger are long dead. Commissions or diplomats or politicians can take
endless refuge behind every fig leaf of doubt. Outside of a formal judicial process,
it only makes sense to speak of a reasonable basis to believe that genocide is occurring
or threatened.
But the ultimate irony of the UNCG is that, when it comes to ‘‘preventing’’ or
‘‘suppressing’’ genocide, a determination of genocide does not trigger any form of action
whatsoever. If this was not already clear from the convention’s plain language, it was
made starkly so by Secretary Powell’s assertion on 9 September 2004, that ‘‘no new
action is dictated by this determination.’’40 Powell’s affirmative determination and the
commission’s negative one had the same effect. The UNCG, for all its supposed moral
force, in actuality contributes little to prevention or suppression.
Powell’s request to the United Nations, pursuant to the permissive provisions
of Article VIII, to launch an investigation was made ‘‘with a view to ensuring
accountability’’—that is, punishment. Yet punishment is not the same as prevention or
suppression. It inevitably occurs, if at all, after the time for preventing or suppressing
has passed. One may argue that a sufficiently real threat of punishment may have a
deterrent effect powerful enough to stop ongoing acts of genocide or to prevent
imminent acts. But that argument is purely theoretical. And the continued
deterioration of the situation in Darfur months after the Security Council referred
the situation to the ICC suggests that the theory may be faulty.
Powell’s request under Article VIII of the UNCG, Security Council Resolution
1564, the UN Commission of Inquiry’s investigation, the commission’s analysis of
genocidal intent—all were couched in the language of law drawn from the UNCG and
other legal instruments. But in a very real sense, the whole process was a burlesque of
law. Essentially, everything documented by the commission was not only knowable but
actually known months and months before the commission was even formed. Even as
the commission was conducting its investigation, the government of Sudan was
continuing to perpetrate the very crimes that the commission was analyzing. During
the whole time that the basic facts have been known, and even since the commission
released its report, no effective action has been taken by the so-called international
community actually to stop the killing and the rapes. It is as though one man is
clubbing another on a street corner while bystanders respond with a prolonged
reflection on whether the incident is premeditated murder or simple assault or even
self-defense. Meanwhile, the crime continues.
Powell, near the end of his testimony in September 2004, told the Senate
committee that ‘‘[w]e have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese
government to act responsibly.’’ He certainly deserves credit for going out of his way
to identify himself with a difficult issue, and there are many officials in the State
Department and elsewhere in the US government who have been working diligently on
Darfur. But the definition of ‘‘everything we can’’ is ultimately a political question, not
a legal one. And effective prevention and suppression of ‘‘genocide’’—or other forms of
mass atrocities against civilian populations—will not occur through a sense of
obligation under international law but as the result of political pressure on
governments by their citizens. As Samantha Power has argued, politicians will act
to stop mass killing when the political cost of inaction outweighs the risk of acting.41
In preparation for the 2005 World Summit, held to mark the sixtieth anniversary
of the United Nations, a draft General Assembly resolution was circulated that would
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have recognized an ‘‘obligation’’ of UN members to use various peaceful means ‘‘to help
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.’’ The draft would also have recognized a ‘‘shared responsibility’’ to take
collective coercive action under the UN Charter if peaceful means fail and national
authorities are ‘‘unwilling or unable to protect their populations.’’ In the end, the first
passage was watered down to acknowledge a ‘‘responsibility’’ to use ‘‘appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means.’’ The second passage jettisoned
the notion of a responsibility to act and replaced it with the statement that
we are prepared to take collective action . . . on a case-by-case basis . . . should peaceful
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.42
Being ‘‘prepared’’ to do something case-by-case is in fact consistent with actually not
doing anything from case to case.
It may well be that the final language approved by the UN General Assembly
represents a normative advance. It is certainly more explicit than anything in the
UNCG. It also broadens the circumstances in which action may be taken beyond the
narrow category of genocide by adding war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity, which may forestall endless arguments about the complex and
problematic notion of genocidal intent. But the final language underscores the fact that
the prevention and suppression of genocide and other mass atrocities will never be
accomplished by the international community, or by members of that community,
through a sense of legal obligation. It will happen, if at all, as a result of political or
practical necessity. Only by recognizing and acting on this reality can we hope to end
the heartbreaking irony of a universally condemned crime that is allowed to occur in
broad daylight.
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The article presents a comparative analysis of genocide in Rwanda and Darfur.
The first half of the article examines the patterns and origins of violence in both
cases and uses the comparison to generate some theoretical inferences about the
causes of genocide. The analysis finds that both cases demonstrate a similar
character of violence but that in Rwanda the violence was more intense, more
exterminatory, and more participatory than in Darfur. Both episodes took place in
the midst of civil war, in periods of political transition, in countries with histories
of ethnic nationalism, and in areas where the conflicting ethnic populations lived
in relative proximity. However, in Rwanda the state is more compact, centralized,
and effective, which may explain the variation in intensity. The second half of the
article focuses on the international response to genocide in both cases. After
Rwanda, observers emphasized the importance of using the label ‘‘genocide’’ and
creating domestic constituencies. Darfur showed that both strategies are insuffi-
cient. In response to Darfur, US officials declared ‘‘genocide’’ to be occurring, and
there emerged a politically diverse civil-society coalition to lobby the administra-
tion. Yet the net outcome for both cases, in terms of the absence of an effective policy
to halt genocide, was the same. The article argues that focusing too intently on a
‘‘genocide’’ determination may be counterproductive, that international politics
matter yet mobilization on Darfur outside of North America was weak, and that
protocols for the use of force to prevent genocide should be clarified.
Introduction
Since the Darfur crisis began in 2003, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 has been a
frequent comparative point of reference. Some commentators have called the violence
in western Sudan ‘‘another Rwanda,’’ others a ‘‘slow-motion’’ Rwanda. Most often, the
comparison has had two primary connotations. The first concerned the violence itself.
Genocide was happening again in Darfur, and hence Darfur was like Rwanda. The
second connotation concerned the international response to the violence. As in
Rwanda, the international community was not acting to stop genocide, and hence
Darfur was like Rwanda.
Both comparative claims are accurate, as far as they go. However, the claims also
deserve closer scrutiny. To what degree are the patterns of violence in Rwanda and
Darfur similar? To what degree are they different? From an international perspective,
in what ways is the response to Darfur similar to and different from what happened in
Rwanda? Answers to these questions have inherent epistemological value, but they
also have theoretical and practical import. From a theoretical perspective, what do the
commonalities and differences between the two cases suggest about why genocide
happens? From a practical perspective, what do the international reactions to both
cases indicate about the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of particular prevention
strategies?
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This article approaches Darfur and Rwanda with these comparative questions and
objectives in mind. The central purpose is to analyze similarities and differences
between the two cases in order to generate theoretical and practical inferences. The
article does not make normative claims about differences between the cases. I argue
below that violence in Rwanda was more intense and more exterminatory than it has
been in Darfur. The point is not that Rwanda’s violence was worse than Darfur’s, nor is
it that Rwanda’s victims suffered more than Darfur’s victims. From a survivor’s
perspective, violence is violence; the loss of a family member is the loss of a family
member. But from a comparative analytical perspective, empirical differences (and
similarities) are important to note because they can generate insights about the causal
dynamics of mass violence. This article focuses only on two cases, and hence the
theoretical inferences have limited generalizability. Nonetheless, because the analogy
between Rwanda and Darfur is often made and because comparative analysis can yield
valuable insights, I pursue it here.
Broadly, the article is divided into two sections, each with several subsections. In
the first main section, I discuss the dynamics of genocide in both cases, addressing the
primary patterns of violence in Darfur and in Rwanda as well as common causal
factors in both cases. I then make some theoretical observations based on the analysis,
noting both similarities and differences. In the second main section, I discuss the
international response to genocide in both cases. Here I focus on three main areas: the
debate over whether to use the label ‘‘genocide’’ in both cases; the formation (or lack
thereof) of a domestic constituency in the United States calling for prevention; and,
finally, international obstacles to prevention.
Dynamics of Genocide in Darfur and Rwanda
Patterns of Violence
One nexus of comparison between the two cases concerns intensity of violence, in
particular the rate of killing (that is, the number of deaths over time). As of this
writing in April 2006, large-scale attacks on civilian populations in Darfur have been
continuing for three years, with some variation over time. Judging from existing data,
it appears that attacks surged in late 2003 and early 2004, declining in early 2005.
The violence also appears concentrated in some parts of Darfur but not in others.1
The number of deaths in this period is the subject of some controversy. Some estimate
between 63,000 and 140,000 violence-related civilian deaths, while others put the
number at 400,000 (Darfur’s population before the violence began was about 6.5
million). The low estimate comes from a 2005 US State Department report. The high
estimate comes from a 2005 report issued by the Coalition for International Justice
(CIJ); the report was based on research conducted in conjunction with other scholars.2
The primary reasons for the divergent estimates in these reports relate to assumptions
about the constancy of violence over time, about the distribution of violence across
regions in Darfur, and about whether existing survey data are representative.
By contrast, the Rwandan genocide took place during the 100-day period from 6
April to 17 July 1994. There was variation in when violence started in different
regions, but ultimately genocidal violence occurred in almost every part of the country
under government control. Most murders took place during the first five weeks of the
genocide. Detailed data from one region (Kibuye Prefecture) indicate that two weeks
into the genocide nearly 80% of all murders had already taken place.3 Estimates of the
number killed in Rwanda range from 500,000 to one million. The difference in the
estimates depends principally on how many Tutsis are said to have lived in Rwanda
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before the genocide. Thus, even a low estimate of the number killed yields a very high
ratio of the number of Tutsis killed as a percentage of the pre-existing Tutsi
population. For example, in one of the best studies of the genocide, Alison Des Forges
gives a low estimate of 500,000 Tutsis killed, but that sum equals 75% of all resident
Tutsis in Rwanda before the genocide.4
Similar ratio estimates for Darfur do not yet exist. In other words, it is not clear
exactly how many black African Darfuris have been killed as a percentage of the pre-
existing black African population. That said, the ratio is likely to be smaller. As of this
writing, there are considerably more black Africans in Darfur who have been displaced
than black Africans who have been killed through direct or indirect means. This is true
even if, to date, the violence in Darfur has lasted ten times longer than it did in
Rwanda. In short, the violence in Rwanda was more intense than that in Darfur—it
was faster and more murderous.
The modes of violence follow the same logic. In Darfur, forced displacement,
destruction of villages, destruction of the means of survival, killing of men, and mass
rape are the principal modes of violence.5 Of these, forced destruction and destruction
of villages are the primary modes of violence and the primary source of mortality in
Darfur. Lacking access to food, clean water, shelter, and medical care, many displaced
Darfuris have died because of disease and malnutrition. According to the CIJ report,
direct killing accounts for about 35% of all deaths.6 Again using the CIJ estimate, the
number displaced in Darfur is about seventeen times the number directly killed. (As of
this writing, an estimated 2.4 million people have been forced from their homes and
are living as refugees in Chad or internally displaced persons [IDPs] within Sudan.) In
short, forced displacement—and the related consequences of disease and malnutri-
tion—is the primary source of death, and this, as we shall see, stands in contrast to
Rwanda.
The violence in Darfur has primarily been against black Africans. Ethnicity
in Darfur is complex, and I discuss it below. But perpetrators often characterize
the targets of their violence as ‘‘blacks,’’ ‘‘Nubas,’’ or ‘‘Zurgas.’’ Darfur is home to
three large black African tribes—the Fur, the Massaleit, and the Zaghawa—and
perpetrators appear to attack anyone who belongs to these groups. Various
investigations are consistent on this point: the violence is deliberately waged against
Darfur’s black African populations.7
The perpetrators in Darfur are mainly government soldiers and militias. The
Sudanese Air Force has also participated in attacks by bombing villages before soldiers
and militias launch ground attacks. There is considerable evidence that the militia,
army, and air force act in a coordinated fashion. Soldiers and militias sleep in the same
camps; the government also has supplied the militias, who most frequently go by
the name ‘‘janjaweed’’ or ‘‘janjiwid.’’8 After studying the matter in some depth, U.S.
officials at the State Department concluded that there was close coordination between
Sudanese armed forces and the militias.9 Militia leaders also readily admit that they
are acting on government orders.10
How does all this compare with the situation in Rwanda? In general, the character
of violence was similar—in both cases, the violence was directed by the state, targeted
at a particular ethnic population, and intended to destroy that ethnic population in
substantial part. If the standard for determining ‘‘genocide’’ is the legal one established
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), both are
cases of genocide. That said, direct killing was the primary mode of violence in
Rwanda. Where Tutsis were found, they were most often killed; there was relatively
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little forced displacement. The violence in Rwanda also happened countrywide (rather
than in one region), and it occurred over a much shorter period of time. In Rwanda,
perpetrators additionally attacked and killed leading Hutu opposition politicians and
Hutus who openly refused to participate in the genocide. Such intra-ethnic violence
appears to be less present in Darfur.
Rwanda, like Darfur, experienced significant levels of sexual violence. Some
authors estimate that 250,000 to 500,000 rapes were perpetrated during the Rwandan
genocide. However, that number is a somewhat imprecise estimate: it is based on the
number of pregnancies from rape reported after the genocide.11 Sexual violence is so
commonly reported in Darfur that it may be more prevalent in that case than in
Rwanda.12 More research on the question is needed. As in Darfur, destruction and
looting of property were features of the violence in Rwanda. Many homes of Tutsis and
dissident Hutus were destroyed, both before and after Tutsis were killed; Tutsi homes
were also occupied during and after the genocide. But in Rwanda, unlike Darfur,
few villages (or other administrative units) were completely destroyed. Prior to the
genocide in Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda lived side by side throughout the
country; there were almost no administrative units where only Tutsis lived. As a
consequence, the destruction of homes was selective, while in Darfur entire villages
were routinely destroyed.
Concerning the perpetrators, as in Darfur, Rwanda’s ge´nocidaires included
soldiers, police, and militia. In many instances, Rwandan soldiers and militia were
instrumental in the largest massacres at church sites, schools, and other locations
where large numbers of Tutsis had gathered. However, one difference between the two
cases concerns civilian mobilization. In Rwanda, state and military officials
deliberately sought—and sometimes required—the participation of large numbers of
Hutu civilian men who, until that point, had had no prior history of violence. The
result was that even though soldiers and militias often were involved in killings of the
greatest magnitude, ordinary civilian men were probably more numerous in the
perpetration of the genocide than were soldiers and militarily trained militias.
Ordinary civilian participation in Darfur seems less present.
The violence in Darfur and that in Rwanda are both examples of state-directed,
large-scale violence against civilian populations defined in ethnic terms. Both cases
resulted in massive loss of life (in Darfur, the loss of life continues); both have
significant levels of sexual violence; and both involve soldiers and militias. The main
differences concern intensity. The violence in Rwanda was faster, more exterminatory,
and more participatory—that is, it involved the participation of far larger numbers of
civilians—than in Darfur. In short, these cases are of the same genre. They are both
cases of genocide—if the standard for genocide is the United Nations Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG). However, the two
cases are not identical.
Origins of Violence in Darfur
The roots of violence in Darfur and Rwanda are complex, but the two cases have a
number of commonalities that, themselves, have theoretical implications. Darfur’s
violence has intersecting local, national, and regional lineages, some stretching back
several decades.
The first principal long-term lineage of the violence in Darfur relates to local
resource conflicts and local ethnic conflict. Identity is not straightforward in Darfur
(nor in Rwanda; more on the latter below). The region is home to more than three
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dozen ethnic and sub-ethnic groupings, but within those groupings there are two main
intersecting cleavages. The first is between sedentary farmers and semi-nomadic
herders; the other is between black Africans and Arabs. The two cleavages usually
overlap—that is, Arab families often engage in semi-nomadic pastoralism, while black
African families often engage in sedentary agriculture. That said, many Arab families
grow crops, and many black Africans raise livestock. Both groups also participate in
non-farming and non-husbandry professions. Moreover, ‘‘black African’’ and ‘‘Arab’’
are somewhat misnomers, in that the two populations, partly because of intermar-
riage, have similar physical appearances, and everyone is technically African. The
groups are also uniformly Muslim. Nonetheless, the Arab and black African social
categories exist and are meaningful to Darfuris.
In recent years, several factors have increased tension between Arabs and black
Africans in the region. Starting in the 1980s, in particular, drought, famine, and
desertification increased competition for dwindling resources, especially water and
grazing areas. Herders encroached on agriculturalists’ lands, leading to mutual
arming. Some nomadic herders began purchasing weapons to protect their livestock
and to increase the roaming range of their animals, while some farmers bought arms to
protect their land.13
National policies and politics increased the local tensions. Northern Arabs have
dominated the Sudanese state since independence. That domination is the source of a
long-running civil war between north and south in Sudan (more below). As conflict in
Darfur escalated, government leaders in the capital, Khartoum, backed local Arabs.
Northern leaders supplied weapons to local Arabs and promoted Arabs in local
government positions, thereby increasing Arab power and leverage in the region and
marginalizing black Africans.14
There was also a regional dynamic, involving a conflict between Chad and Libya.
In order to unseat a government in Chad, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi funded
Chadian rebels based in Darfur. The presence of Chadian rebels in Darfur in the 1970s
and 1980s had two principal effects. The first was that it led to the availability of cheap
weapons, which facilitated the arming of both local Arabs and local Africans. The
second was that the Chadians and Libyans, in particular, introduced and promoted
Arab supremacist ideology in Darfur. Libya is also the source of a Darfuri Arab
supremacist organization called the ‘‘Arab Gathering’’ or ‘‘Arab Union.’’15
The sequencing of these local, national, and regional influences is not yet clear.
But this brief discussion highlights two important points. First, conflict between Arabs
and black Africans in Darfur was real and salient prior to the eruption of mass violence
in 2003; the conflict intensified in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s. Second,
the ethnic divisions have a history—the conflict is not one of ‘‘ancient hatreds’’ but,
rather, one whereby particular conditions and influences increased the salience of
ethnicity and intensified tension between groups. As some Darfuris claim, ‘‘Conflict
defines origins’’—that is, identity-based cleavages are as much the consequences as the
causes of violence.16
There is another, more proximate lineage to the violence in Darfur—namely, the
gradual ending of the civil war between the northern, Arab-dominated government, on
the one hand, and Christian and animist black southerners, on the other. Various
iterations of the North–South war have afflicted Sudan for all but ten years since the
country’s independence from Britain in 1956. Since 1983, alone, the war in the south
has cost an estimated two million lives. Beginning in 2001, however, the government
and the main southern rebel movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
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(SPLM), entered into comprehensive peace negotiations. After numerous rounds of
talks, the two sides reached agreement; in January 2005, government and rebel
delegations officially ended the war, to much international acclaim. However, Darfur
was not represented in the negotiations. Black Africans in Darfur, who had felt
marginalized because of government-supported discrimination and who had conflicted
with local Arabs in the past, worried about their future in post-war Sudan. Those
various concerns led two black African groups to launch an armed rebellion against the
Sudanese state in 2003.17
Civil war is the other principal proximate origin of genocide in Darfur. After
officially launching the rebellion, rebels in Darfur won a series of battles against
government forces.18 The government responded by arming and supporting Arab
militias; together, they targeted the rebels and the rebels’ presumed supporters: ‘‘black
Africans’’ became the enemy. The result is what we have seen: coordinated military–
militia attacks on the black African population of Darfur. The goal—according to a
document cited by Julie Flint and Alex de Waal—became to ‘‘change the demography
of Darfur and empty it of African tribes.’’19
Origins of Violence in Rwanda
The roots of violence in Rwanda have much in common with those in Darfur. In
Rwanda, ethnicity was a salient cleavage that pre-existed the mass violence, although,
as in Darfur, ethnic difference in and of itself also did not cause violence during most
periods. In Rwanda, there are two principal ethnic groupings, Hutu and Tutsi (though
other identities, including regional, class, and clan, also matter). Hutus and Tutsis do
not fit a standard model of deeply divided ethnic groups. The two groups speak the
same language, practice the same religions, live in the same regions, and share
numerous other attributes. Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda also intermarried frequently,
at least before the genocide.
That said, Rwanda has a pronounced history of political ideologies based on
ethnicity and race. That history is long (and beyond the terms of this article), but the
colonial and independence periods are critical to understand. The colonial experience
racialized and hardened previously more fluid and more complex identities.20 The
exact precolonial nature of the Hutu and Tutsi categories is unclear, but they related to
status, economic activity, and relationship to the monarchy. Europeans, however, saw
Hutus and Tutsis as races, and the colonialists favored the Tutsis, whom they viewed
as a superior race. In the colonial system, Tutsis were systematically favored, and an
elaborate racial discourse developed to support Tutsi power. That changed at
independence, when Hutu counter-elites argued that Hutus should rule because
they were the majority (constituting about 85% of the population). The Belgians
ultimately backed that position, giving birth to the ‘‘Hutu Revolution,’’ whereby Tutsis
were violently ousted from power, the monarchy was abolished, and Hutus came to
dominate the newly independent Rwanda. An ideology of Hutu rule remained a part of
Rwandan political culture, particularly among elites, even if, on a day-to-day basis,
ordinary Hutus and Tutsis interacted without hostility at most times from
independence through the 1990s.
Like Darfur’s, Rwanda’s genocide also had proximate roots. In particular, the mass
violence in Rwanda occurred during a civil war. Rwanda experienced two primary
phases of war. Between 1990 and 1993, Tutsi-dominated rebels fought Hutu-led
government forces. In August 1993, the two sides signed a peace agreement, but on 6
April 1994, the Rwandan president was assassinated, which triggered a new round of
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the civil war. The genocide occurred during the second phase of the civil war, and the
logic of war was central to the rationale for killing Tutsi civilians. Tutsis—all Tutsis—
were labeled rebel accomplices and killed as wartime ‘‘enemies.’’
Like Darfur’s, Rwanda’s violence occurred during a period of political upheaval. In
Sudan, the sources of political change and instability were the peace negotiations with
the southern rebels and factionalism within the ruling party.21 In Rwanda, the sources
of change and instability were the civil war, the peace negotiations, and the transition
from a single-party to a multi-party state. In Rwanda, the civil war displaced tens of
thousands; the 1993 peace agreement called for a major restructuring of the army; and
multi-partyism undermined and threatened the power of ruling elites (as did the civil
war).
In short, the two episodes have some causal factors in common. In particular, the
violence took place in the midst of a war between governments and rebel groups that,
respectively, had strong ethnic identifications. In both episodes, the violence happened
during a period of political turmoil and change. And in both countries there pre-existed
political ideologies based on ethnicity and a history of ethnic identification. The point is
not that there was ‘‘ancient ethnic hatred’’ in both places but that ethnic classifications
and ethnic political ideologies were meaningful and resonant prior to the violence.
But, as previously mentioned, violence in Rwanda was more intense and more
exterminatory than that in Darfur. One reason for this may relate to the character of
state power. In contrast to Sudan, Rwanda is a compact, densely populated country
with centralized and locally intensive state institutions. The Rwandan state also has a
long history of forced labor, a history that dates back to the precolonial period (and
extends into the colonial and postcolonial periods). The geography is one of rolling,
farmed or grazed hills—making the rural population vulnerable to local surveillance.
By contrast, Sudan is a vast, sparsely populated state with a more decentralized
governing structure. Darfur has, moreover, experienced political and administrative
neglect since well before independence.22 The result is that Sudan’s state capacity for
local control and civilian mobilization is less than Rwanda’s. The patterns of violence
follow: in Darfur, the violence is slower, less intense, and less participatory than in
Rwanda. The character of state institutions and power in both places may, in part,
explain this variation.
Theoretical Implications
What, if any, are the theoretical implications of this brief comparative analysis? The
analysis is not a definitive test of different theories of genocide. Nonetheless, the
comparison does yield some theoretical inferences, and it does provide some evidence
to support (and detract from) different existing explanations of mass ethnic violence.
Viewed together, Darfur and Rwanda provide evidence to support the hypothesis
that genocide happens in periods of political upheaval and transition.23 By contrast,
the evidence detracts from theories such as those of Rudolph Rummel, who claims that
absolute power is a precondition for genocide.24 In both Rwanda and Sudan, national
elites chose radical, genocidal measures as their power eroded or threatened to erode.
In both cases, the sources of the erosion were sharp divisions within ruling coalitions,
looming elections combined with limited public support for ruling parties, peace
negotiations that would have led to significant change, and civil war. It was in this
context of fractured and fracturing power—not one of absolute, uncontested dictator-
ship—that national elites, who still dominated key institutions such as the military,
chose extreme strategies to maintain their control and dominance.
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Darfur and Rwanda also provide evidence to support the hypothesis that war and
genocide are causally related. In both cases, genocide happened during periods of
intense civil war. Perpetrators in both cases linked the logic of war to the logic of mass
violence; that is, they justified their tactics as counter-insurgency and self-defense.
Moreover, in both cases the strategy of mass violence occurred as government forces
were on the defensive. In Rwanda, Hutu hardliners committed genocide as they were
losing ground to rebels; in Darfur, hardliners advocated mass violence after the rebels
won a series of victories. That war was a central causal factor in the Rwandan genocide
is a central conclusion of my own research.25 Scholars of genocide increasingly point to
the importance of war.26 Darfur provides further evidence to confirm the claim.
Intense, defensive episodes of civil war combined with political upheaval and fractured
power appear to drive extreme violent measures on the part of ruling elites.
Scholars of genocide have consistently highlighted a relationship between
ideological notions of perfection, utopia, and purity, on the one hand, and mass
violence, on the other.27 The idea that genocide is rooted in top-down ideological
attempts to create utopias has clear application to the Nazi case, as well as to
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. However, Darfur and Rwanda do not lend clear
support to the hypothesis. In both cases, ideologies of ethnic nationalism and exclusive
ethnic rule pre-existed the violence (see below), but in neither case do there appear to
be the kinds of messianic, metaphysical, and fantastical notions associated with
creating perfection. In Darfur and Rwanda, war, fractured power, political upheaval,
and the associated material fears drove the radicalization of national elites more than
utopian, revolutionary visions of society did.
Both Rwanda and Darfur indicate the importance of ethnic nationalism, but in
surprising ways. In Rwanda, an ideology of majoritarian Hutu nationalism under-
pinned each post-independence government before the genocide. In Sudan, Arab
nationalism has been a consistent feature of Khartoum governments since indepen-
dence.28 At the same time, however, in both cases the mass violence happened as—or
after—ruling elites had entered into peace negotiations with formerly excluded groups.
In Rwanda, just prior to the genocide, the Habyarimana government had signed a
peace agreement (the Arusha Accords) with Tutsi rebels; in Sudan, as Darfur broke,
the al-Bashir government was in the process of finalizing a peace deal with southern
rebels. Many argue that Rwanda’s peace deal led to extremism; the compromise with
Tutsi rebels angered nationalists, who then turned to irregular measures to keep
power.29 It is unclear whether something similar happened in Sudan. But genocide did
not happen during a period of official insistence on exclusive ethnic nationalism;
rather, in both cases, the mass violence happened after or during peace negotiations
with previously excluded ‘‘others.’’ None of this detracts from the claim that ethnic
nationalism is an ideological foundation for genocide.30 Empirically, however, the
evidence from both cases suggests that the timing of mass violence relates to when the
ethnic exclusivity of a ruling coalition is ending or threatens to end.
Rwanda and Darfur also provide some evidence about the importance of ethnicity
to genocide, but, again, in surprising ways. Some theories suggest that deep divisions,
hatred, and widespread prejudice are essential conditions of large-scale violence and
genocide.31 Ethnicity was salient before the mass violence in both Darfur and Rwanda.
However, what is unusual about these two cases is that the communities in question
lived in relative proximity, and thus both Darfur and Rwanda suggest that ethnic
proximity may matter more than ethnic distance in producing mass violence. In
Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis are interconnected populations. Not only do Hutus and
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Tutsis speak the same language, practice the same religion, and so forth, they also,
before the genocide, lived next door to one another throughout the country and
intermarried. In Sudan, much of the country is deeply split between northern Arab
Muslims and southern black Christians and animists. But Darfur does not fit that
mold. As noted above, Darfuris are uniformly Muslim; Arabs and Africans live in
relative proximity (at least compared to Arabs and black Africans in other parts of the
country); and there was some intermarriage between the groups.
Why ethnic proximity might lead to mass violence is less clear. It may be that
proximity increases security fears in wartime. It may be that opportunity for violence
is greater: if ethnic groups live in distant parts of the country, then mass killing
becomes more difficult. It may be that proximity increases information, which, in turn,
facilitates killing. These (and other) hypotheses deserve more research. The argument
does not apply to all cases of genocide; it would appear not to work, for example, for the
Armenian genocide (though it does appear to work for what took place in Bosnia in the
1990s). The point is only that the evidence from Darfur and Rwanda indicates that
mass violence happens among relatively proximate ethnic communities, and this may
offer some clue as to why violence happens on this scale.
The various claims in this section are neither comprehensive nor conclusive.
Objections may be raised to each of the arguments. Every war does not lead to
genocide, every period of political instability does not lead to extremism, and there are
many instances of ethnic proximity in which peace holds over time. Each point needs
theoretical refinement. Nonetheless, the comparison does reveal some counterintuitive
patterns, and it does generate theoretical inferences, which, in turn, point the way for
further comparative research.
International Responses
Darfur and Rwanda are instructive for what they demonstrate not only about causal
dynamics but also about prevention strategies (or lack thereof). Darfur and Rwanda
are ‘‘negative’’ cases in that a concrete policy to stop the killing did not take shape in
either episode. Analyzing the cases together offers some insight into why or why not.
After Rwanda, analysts and activists gleaned certain lessons about how to generate an
effective international response to genocide. Those lessons, in turn, shaped the social
and activist response to Darfur. Yet the strategies that emerged around Darfur have
not yet been successful in leading to a policy to halt the violence. Thus Darfur
highlights dimensions that Rwanda did not, and comparing the cases offers insight
that would not be evident if only one of the cases were considered in isolation.
The Genocide Debate
Darfur and Rwanda both show(ed) that terminology debates are central, and probably
inevitable, when crises of such magnitude break out. In particular, whether to label
each case one of ‘‘genocide’’ was (and continues to be, in the case of Darfur) a major
point of discussion, though the outcomes differed. In the Rwandan case, powerful
international actors chose not to use the word ‘‘genocide.’’ US State Department
spokespeople were told that they could only refer to ‘‘acts of genocide.’’ That directive
led to the now infamous exchange in which spokeswoman Christine Shelly was pressed
on whether genocide was happening in Rwanda but would only acknowledge ‘‘acts of
genocide.’’ How many ‘‘acts of genocide’’ does it take to make genocide? she was asked.
Shelly would not answer.32
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The issue within the Clinton administration was that intervention was not a viable
policy option. Less than a year after American soldiers were killed and dragged
through the streets in Mogadishu, top American officials had no appetite for deploying
troops in a risky situation in Central Africa. Nor did UN officials want to expose
peacekeepers to increased risk after Somalia.33 The label ‘‘genocide’’ mattered because
American officials worried that under the UNCG, which the US Senate had ratified,
the United States would be obligated to act if the government formally recognized that
genocide was occurring. Since forceful action was off the table, American officials did
not want the term ‘‘genocide’’ used—despite overwhelming evidence that genocide was
indeed occurring in Rwanda. Many observers concluded that the take-away lesson
from Rwanda was that, even in the face of resistance to intervention, calling the
violence ‘‘genocide’’ would trigger a forceful response.
Fast-forward to Darfur. In 2003, as the crisis unfolded, Darfur received little
international attention. But 2004 was the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan
genocide and the year that the violence in Darfur deepened. Both issues led to
increased attention to Darfur. Given the experience of Rwanda a decade before, one
focal point for activists was to pressure US officials to label the violence ‘‘genocide.’’
During the summer of 2004, in particular, President George W. Bush came under
pressure from an unusual coalition of actors to call Darfur ‘‘genocide.’’ Congress passed
a unanimous and historic declaration labeling the violence in Darfur ‘‘genocide.’’ In
response, Secretary of State Colin Powell hired an NGO, the Coalition for
International Justice, to conduct a survey that would allow him to make a
determination. That, NGO, in turn helped establish the Darfur Atrocities
Documentation Team (ADT), which traveled to Chad and conducted an innovative
survey of more than 1,100 Darfuri refugees.34
The results were convincing. The survey showed clearly that the violence was
directed at black African Darfuris, that the government supported the violence, that
the violence was widespread and organized, and that the aim was to destroy the
population in substantial part. What was happening in Darfur was genocide. Powell
subsequently appeared before a US Senate committee and declared that the term
‘‘genocide’’ applied to the violence in Darfur. The declaration was the first time a US
administration official of such high ranking had conclusively declared genocide to be
happening while the genocide was under way. Several weeks later, President Bush
made the same claim in an address to the United Nations.35
However, the genocide declarations did not result in the kind of policy that many
had hoped for. On this, Powell was clear: a formal genocide declaration would not lead
to concrete policy changes on the part of the US government. Instead Powell brought
the measure to the UN Security Council, which eventually created a commission to
determine if, indeed, genocide was occurring. The resulting report by the UN
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur documented the patterns of violence described by the
Darfur ADT, as well as by other human-rights organizations and eyewitnesses.
However, the commission concluded that ‘‘genocide’’ was not the right label because
there was not conclusive evidence that Sudan’s leaders intended to destroy the black
African population in substantial part. The commission’s report states that crimes
against humanity had occurred—and that such crimes are as bad as genocide.36 The
UN Security Council referred the matter to the International Criminal Court, which
has subsequently begun investigating the crimes committed in Darfur. But more than
a year later, a concrete policy has yet to be put in place to stop the violence, despite the
historic determinations of genocide.
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What does all this show? First, the UNCG is not as powerful as some imagined.
The convention holds that signatories are obligated to ‘‘prevent’’ genocide, but it lacks
specific measures and mechanisms detailing how such prevention would work. In
short, triggering the convention is not sufficient to provoke concrete international
preventative action. There is thus a premium either on strengthening the convention,
with a view toward making it more concrete, or on developing other protocols to trigger
a forceful international response to massive violations of human rights (see below for
more on the latter course).
Second, Darfur shows the risks of pushing too hard on a genocide determination.
‘‘Genocide’’ is a contested concept, one upon which reasonable people can disagree.
Some people hold a broad view of genocide as large-scale mass violence directed
against members of a particular social category, such as an ethnic or political group.
Others hold a narrower view of genocide as extermination.37 The violence in Darfur is
not a clear-cut case of intentional annihilation of an ethnic group, and hence some
observers are uncomfortable using the label ‘‘genocide.’’ Ge´rard Prunier, for example,
calls Darfur an ‘‘ambiguous genocide’’ and a ‘‘quasi-genocide.’’38 The UN Commission
of Inquiry concluded that the term was not warranted. Other careful and thoughtful
analysts reach the same conclusion.39 The point is that real differences do exist in
defining ‘‘genocide,’’ and Darfur shows that those differences will surface in the midst
of crises and during situations that are not clear-cut cases of extermination. By
extension, insisting too narrowly on using the label of ‘‘genocide’’ can, and in this case
did, impede a policy discussion about how to halt the killing.
Domestic Constituencies
Darfur and Rwanda also provide an instructive contrast on domestic constituencies. In
Rwanda, there was fairly little activism as the genocide unfolded. Human-rights
organizations lobbied the Clinton administration and United Nations representatives,
and many newspapers put Rwanda on their front pages, especially toward the end of
the crisis. But there was no great public outcry to stop genocide in Rwanda.40 To be
sure, the violence there was quick, and thus there was limited time to generate
significant domestic pressure on the issue. Nonetheless, the lesson from Rwanda was
that if activists expected political leaders to take risky and costly preventative actions,
then they needed to lobby their representatives and to create domestic momentum.
After reviewing various twentieth-century cases of genocide, Samantha Power
concludes that ‘‘the battle to stop genocide has . . . been repeatedly lost in the realm
of domestic politics.’’41 For the battle to be won, argues Power, constituents, civil
society, elite opinion makers, and bureaucrats within the government need to pressure
representatives to create the necessary political will.
Darfur was different. In 2003, it is true, the violence received little international
attention. But the situation changed in 2004 and 2005; in particular, in 2004, a UN
official compared Darfur to Rwanda;42 the tenth anniversary of the events in Rwanda
took place (and generated much interest and concern for Darfur); and the film Hotel
Rwanda was released, giving considerable visibility to Rwanda and to genocide.
Starting in 2004, a powerful and politically diverse informal coalition formed to
pressure the Bush administration. That coalition included evangelical Christians,
African Americans, human-rights organizations, Jewish-American groups, and
government officials who were angered at what had happened in Rwanda a decade
earlier. High-profile journalists, especially New York Times columnist Nicholas
Kristof, wrote powerfully and doggedly about Darfur. There was also very vibrant
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student activism on Darfur on dozens of college and university campuses in the United
States and Canada.
Rarely has there been such sustained, widespread, and politically eclectic
domestic, civil-society activism on a foreign-policy issue, especially one that concerns
Africa. African politics and issues only infrequently make editorial pages and only
rarely become the subject of activist campaigns. Even then, particular issues remain
salient only for short periods. Not so with Darfur: the pressure has been fairly
consistent and persistent, even if the tsunami in December 2005 distracted attention
from Darfur, at least for a while. US officials were responsive: domestic pressure
resulted in the historic declarations of genocide, as we have seen. But the domestic
pressure was not sufficient to generate a concrete policy to stop the genocide. Power
may be right that the battle to halt genocide in the past has been lost in domestic
politics, but it is also hard to imagine a more politically appealing and pervasive
constituency forming on a human-rights issue in an African country. In short, Darfur
shows that domestic pressure may be necessary, but it is not sufficient.
Obstacles to Intervention
In truth, there are many reasons why no intervention policy materialized. American
troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the course of the former war,
made it politically difficult for US officials to deploy soldiers to an African country where
they would have a strong moral purpose but lack a clear exit strategy. That being the
case, a critical question is why other international actors did not take a leadership role on
Darfur. Indeed, the battle to stop genocide in Darfur was lost less in domestic American
politics than in the international arena. This, too, is a lesson from Darfur: international
politics matter for developing a coherent and effective response to genocide.
Domestic constituents pressured American officials on Darfur, and American
officials, in turn, brought the issue to the UN Security Council; it was there that the
momentum to change policy on Darfur fizzled. American officials may be criticized for
not doing more on Darfur, but it is clear that the American initiative ran into a
phalanx of opposition at the Security Council. In particular, China and Russia initially
blocked any serious resolution to punish Sudan through sanctions. In April 2006,
however, China and Russia abstained on a US proposal to impose limited sanctions on
both government forces and rebels. Still, there remains hostility to the idea of
authorizing a military force to intervene in Darfur with a forceful mandate. China
obtains a significant share of its oil from Sudan and has substantial investments there;
Russia sells weapons to Sudan. Moreover, both countries are generally hostile to the
idea that human-rights issues trump sovereignty. As two of the five permanent
members of the Security Council, Russia and China acted as effective veto players
when it came to harnessing the United Nations to take preventive action in Darfur.
Even beyond Russia and China, however, the issue of Darfur never gained much
traction. In particular, Darfur did not capture the kind of public or political attention
or concern in Europe that it did in the United States. Why Darfur never gained a head
of steam in Europe is a story that remains to be written. Did Iraq cast a shadow over
Darfur? That is, after Iraq, did the European public and political establishment
distrust American leadership, especially concerning military action in an oil-
producing, Arab-identified state? Or is the reason that the European Union is not
an effective foreign-policy-making institution for dealing with crises outside Europe?
The issue requires further investigation. Predictably, American officials encountered
suspicion and opposition in the Arab world as they pressed for action on Darfur. The
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responses of African leaders were more mixed. In the end, the African Union deployed
troops on a ceasefire-monitoring mission, but the troops’ mandate was limited to
protecting monitors and did not extend to protecting Darfuri civilians. The AU troops
also lacked the resources, troop strength, and training to halt the violence.43
The issues underlying international paralysis in the face of genocide will not be
easy to resolve. Despite widespread ratification of the UNCG, and despite repeated
claims that halting massive abuses of human rights is a top priority of the United
Nations, there remain deep divisions between states over the use of military force to
stop genocide. The issue of sovereignty is particularly contentious when the
intervening powers come from the West or the North and the subjects of intervention
from the South, or less powerful states in general. There is clearly international
suspicion that humanitarian intervention will be a mask for material and strategic
interests. Powerful states may sidestep international disagreement when cases erupt
near their borders. In 1999 in Kosovo, for example, American and Western European
leaders employed NATO forces when Russia, China, and other countries blocked the
Security Council from authorizing force. But for cases where less is at stake
economically and strategically—those in Africa, for example—ignoring international
opposition and sidestepping the United Nations become more difficult.
One way forward is to clarify international protocols for confronting genocide
and for using military force to stop it. This would require renewed debate on the vexing
questions surrounding humanitarian intervention.44 The ‘‘Responsibility to Protect’’
framework is a key initiative, one that received nominal backing at the 2005 UN
summit in New York. But many concrete issues remain. Central to any policy will be
determining a threshold for intervention, establishing clear mechanisms to identify
the threshold, and clarifying international protocols for deploying the use of force once
a threshold is met and other options are exhausted. Consensus on these issues remains
distant, and it would be naı¨ve to think that finding consensus will be easy. But Darfur
shows that without resolution on some of these matters, there is little reason to expect
a concrete and effective international response to genocide when it occurs.
The importance of international civic coalitions is another lesson from Darfur.
American audiences took to heart the lessons from Rwanda, as we have seen. They
were told that their representatives’ phones needed to ring. Activists, in turn,
developed a diverse coalition and successfully lobbied American legislators and the
administration as the Darfur genocide unfolded. The effort was successful. But the
international stage was where a policy to halt the violence in Darfur lost momentum.
Clarifying international protocols to stop genocide will help, as I have argued, but so,
too, will building an international coalition to prevent genocide.
. . .
In early May, as this issue was going to press, there were signs of progress.
Responding to a new and intense round of lobbying, US officials initiated a major
diplomatic effort to obtain a peace agreement between the Sudanese government and
the Darfuri rebels. British, Canadian, and some African governments strongly
supported the initiative. After days of intense negotiations, Sudanese government
officials and the largest Darfuri rebel faction signed an agreement. Two rebel factions
refused. The peace deal could lead to a lull in the violence and to a UN peacekeeping
force in Darfur, though it is too early to know whether either will happen. But the
diplomacy demonstrated the kind of coordinated and international effort required to
make genocide prevention a reality.
. . .
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The US Investigation into the Darfur Crisis
and the US Government’s Determination
of Genocide
Samuel Totten
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
This article examines the genesis and implementation of the Atrocities
Documentation Project initiated by the US State Department as well as the US
government’s determination that genocide had been perpetrated in Darfur, Sudan,
between late 2003 and August 2004. In doing so, the author considers and analyzes
the rationale for the investigation and the reasoning for the genocide determina-
tion, as given by various US officials. He also delineates and discusses the
perceptions of various scholars vis-a`-vis the same issues, noting that many of the
latter suspect there were ulterior motives behind the genesis and implementation of
the investigation as well as the genocide determination. Finally, the author
discusses the positive aspects of the investigation and the potential negative
ramifications of the genocide determination.
Introduction
In July and August 2004, the US Department of State sponsored a field investigation,
the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project (ADP), whose express purpose was
to ascertain whether genocide had been and/or continued to be perpetrated in Darfur.
By that point, the Darfur crisis had been declared ‘‘the worst humanitarian disaster in
the world’’ by Jan Egeland, the UN under secretary for humanitarian affairs;1 the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Committee on Conscience had issued a
genocide warning vis-a`-vis the killings and death in Darfur; and both the US House of
Representatives and US Senate had declared the situation to be a case of genocide.
Following an analysis of the data collected by the Darfur Atrocities Documentation
Team (ADT), Secretary of State Colin Powell declared, on 9 September 2004, in a
statement to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that genocide had been
perpetrated in Darfur.
In the year and a half since the investigation and subsequent declaration by
Powell, heated debate has erupted over the true motives and value of the ADP as well
as over the validity of the genocide determination. Some have asserted that while
crimes against humanity have been perpetrated in Darfur, genocide has not. What
follows is a discussion of the stated purpose, methodology, and findings of the ADP, as
well as the debate over the motives behind the project and the determination of
genocide by the US government.
Purpose, Location, Methodology
As noted above, during the late summer of 2004, the US Department of State
undertook an investigation to assess whether government of Sudan (GoS) troops and/
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or the Janjaweed (Arab militia) had committed genocide against the black African
population in Darfur. As Stephen Kostas notes,
By all accounts, Andrew Natsios’ frequent warnings of a growing humanitarian crisis in
Darfur first alerted the US Department of State to the gravity of the situation there.
Natsios, head of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
made nine trips to Sudan between late 2003 and spring 2004 and repeatedly warned
key officials at the State Department that conditions were grave and deteriorating.2
Continuing, Kostas reports,
During early 2004, [Lorne] Craner, Assistant Secretary for the State Department’s
Bureau of Democracy, held regular intelligence briefs with the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). [Pierre-Richard]
Prosper [then US ambassador-at-large for war crimes, who had previously served as the
prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) case against
Jean-Paul Akayesu and obtained the first conviction for genocide in an international
court] recalls that ‘‘as we moved into the spring of 2004, it became a little clearer,
at least from the information that was emerging from our people as well as NGOs
[non-governmental organizations], that there was a deliberate targeting and killing of
the African population.’’3
Significantly, the ADP was the first official investigation by one sovereign nation
(the United States) into the internal strife of another sovereign nation (Sudan) for the
express purpose of ascertaining whether genocide had been perpetrated or not.4 Under
the auspices of the US Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor (DRL), the Coalition for International Justice (CIJ), an NGO, was hired to
recruit the investigators and to coordinate the investigation on the ground. Ultimately,
twenty-four investigators from around the world formed the ADT. The areas of
expertise and backgrounds of these investigators were eclectic; the investigators
included, for example, an expert in the field of sex crimes and international law;
a prosecutor for the US Justice Department (who had also served as a prosecutor for
the ICTR); a New York City district attorney (who had worked as an investigator
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY]); two
experts on genocide; and a detective from London who had served as an investigator
with the ICTY.
Upon their arrival in Abeche, a desert town in the far reaches of eastern Chad, the
investigators were briefed by both CIJ and USAID personnel on the then current
situation in Darfur and the status of the refugee camps in Chad. Additionally, they
were given several hours of training. The US State Department’s Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) provided a detailed discussion of the research
methodology and questionnaire devised for the investigation, emphasizing throughout
the significance of conducting a systematic study with a random selection of
respondents. The training also included a tutorial by a female police officer from the
United States (who had also worked as an investigator with the ICTY) on interviewing
victims of sexual assault. As each investigator would have his or her own interpreter
who spoke Arabic, English, and one or more tribal languages, a session on working
with interpreters was provided, conducted by a professor of linguistics, an expert on
translation and working with translators, from the University of Stockholm.
Following the training session, teams of investigators were dispersed to informal
settlements and UNHCR refugee camps lining the Chad side of the Chad/Sudan border
which housed black African refugees forced from their villages in Darfur by GoS troops
and/or the Janjaweed. As noted in the State Department’s report on the ADP,
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‘‘a plurality of the respondents were ethnic Zaghawa (46 percent), with smaller
numbers belonging to the Fur (8 percent) and Massalit (30 percent) ethnic groups.’’5
Once in the field and ready to conduct interviews, each investigator and translator
selected a section of the camp and counted off every tenth tent. If more than one adult
(eighteen years of age or older) was present, a method of randomly selecting the
interviewee was used and the person selected was asked if he or she was willing to be
interviewed. (Few people declined to be interviewed, and when they did it was
generally due to being extremely, if not gravely, ill or when engaged in work that had
to be completed. In such a situation, the interviewer and interpreter moved on to the
next occupied tent and the process of selection was repeated.) Once a person agreed to
be interviewed, the rest of the people in the immediate area were politely asked to
leave until the interview had been completed. This precaution was taken to enable
respondents to answer the interview questions as honestly and openly as possible,
without pressure or interference from family members or others.
All investigators used the eight-page Darfur Refugees Questionnaire, developed
in Washington, DC, via a collaborative effort involving members of various non-
governmental organizations (including the CIJ), the American Bar Association, and
staff from the State Department.6
Initially, the investigator asked his or her interpreter to introduce himself (the
translator), then the investigator. Then, through the interpreter, the investigator
delineated the purpose and focus of the interview. The interviewee was informed that
the investigator was there to speak with him or her about his or her experience in the
Darfur region of Sudan and that his or her name, identity, and responses would
remain confidential. The investigator also informed the interviewee that participation
in the project did not, in any way, guarantee compensation for that which had been
stolen from him or her, nor did it guarantee that he or she would be asked to press
charges against an alleged perpetrator or to testify at any future trial(s). Finally, each
interviewee was informed that he or she should only agree to be interviewed if he or
she truly wanted to be, as participation was totally voluntary and there would be no
repercussions for choosing not to participate.
The interviewer began by seeking such information as the name, age, ethnic group,
and years of schooling of the respondent. Subsequently, interviewees were asked to
locate, on a series of maps provided for the investigators by the State Department, the
town, village, or settlement from which they had been forced. Next, the interviewees
were asked about when and why they had left their homes; if they had been harmed
(and, if so, how); if other members of their family or their village had been harmed or
killed (and, if so, who and how); if any property had been stolen from them or destroyed
(and, if so, exactly how many cows, camels, goats, donkeys, chickens, bags of grain and
seed, etc.); if their abode and/or village/settlement had been destroyed, partially or
completely; if specific groups of people had been singled out for denunciation and/or
brutality (and, if so, who and in what way(s)); if any members of their immediate
family, extended family, and/or fellow villagers perished on the way to the refugee
camp or settlement in which they were now residing in Chad (and, if so, who and how);
why they thought they had been attacked and forced from their homes; and if, on the
journey to Chad, they had witnessed or heard about other attacks on people and
villages.
The interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and two hours; the average was
about one hour. During the course of each interview, the investigator asked follow-up
questions in order to have the respondents clarify and elaborate on points and to move
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from the general to the specific (e.g., if four attackers entered a home, were they
members of the GoS and/or Janjaweed? What were the attackers wearing, and did they
have any particular insignia on their uniforms or any noticeable marks, such as
tattoos, scars, or disfigurements, that might help to identify them later?).
At the conclusion of each day, the investigators completed a one-page ‘‘preliminary
atrocity field coding sheet’’ that included some thirty-six items or ‘‘event codes’’
(e.g., witnessed an immediate family member being killed; had been wounded; heard
any racial epithets, and if so, what they were; had livestock stolen from him/her, and,
if so, what kind and how many of each; witnessed aerial bombing; experienced
destruction of personal property, and, if so, what; experienced the looting of personal
property, and, if so, what; was personally raped; witnessed others being raped;
witnessed a shooting in home village). Additionally, there were about twelve
‘‘perpetrators codes’’ (e.g., GoS troops, Janjaweed, other).
Findings
Ultimately, the State Department statistically analyzed 1,136 interviews conducted
during the month-long ADP. Following the compilation and analysis of the survey
data,7 State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported that ‘‘analysis of the
refugee interviews points to a pattern of abuse against members of Darfur’s non-Arab
communities.’’8 More specifically, the interviewees reported personally witnessing or
experiencing the following: killing of family member (61%); killing of non-family
member (67%); shooting (44%); death from displacement (28%); abduction (25%);
beating (21%); rape (16%); hearing racial epithets (33%); village destruction (81%);
theft of livestock (89%); aerial bombing (67%); destruction of personal property
(55%); and looting of personal property (47%).9
Significantly, the State Department report notes that ‘‘numerous credible reports
corroborate the use of racial and ethnic epithets by both the Jingaweit and GOS
military personnel: ‘Kill the slaves! Kill the slaves!’; and ‘We have orders to kill all the
blacks’ are common.’’10
With respect to those who carried out the attacks against the black Africans and
their villages, the refugees’ responses indicated the following: ‘‘both the Janjaweed
and the GOS military (48%); the GOS alone (26%); the Janjaweed alone (14%) and
unknown (12%).’’11
The Factors Resulting in the Genocide Finding
Once the study was completed, the findings and analysis were turned over to US
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Pierre-Richard Prosper and US Secretary of
State Colin Powell. Kostas, who interviewed Prosper in order to ascertain how the
United States arrived at its ‘‘genocide determination,’’ reports that ‘‘Craner and
Prosper presented the State Department’s approach as dispassionate and clinical.
The purpose was ‘to make a pure decision’—a ‘clean legal and factual analysis’ free
of policy considerations—[. . . and in doing so they] ‘analyzed the facts with the breadth
of the law in mind—meaning, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes . . .’’’.12
Through a series of wide-ranging telephone conversations and meetings (between
Powell and Prosper and between Powell and various assistant secretaries within the
State Department) in which the participants compared and contrasted the findings of
the ADP with the wording in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), it was gradually determined that genocide had been,
and possibly continued to be, perpetrated in Darfur.
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In speaking with Kostas and Eric Markusen during the course of a telephone
interview, Prosper noted that he and Powell had had a long and detailed discussion
regarding the important but always sticky issue of ‘‘intent’’ (i.e., the intent of the
perpetrators). Among the issues they discussed were ‘‘‘how they [the GoS] created
these militias [the Janjaweed]; how they [the GoS] had the ability to rein them [the
militias] in and then did not; how they [the GoS troops] acted in concert with the
Janjaweed . . . in attacking these [black African] villages . . . the aerial bombardment
and then Janjaweed would come in; and then the fact that the government of Sudan
would block humanitarian assistance to people in need.’’13 The aforementioned actions
(and, in certain cases, failures to act) led the State Department to infer genocidal
intent.
Prosper also spelled out the factors State Department officials considered in
coming to their determination of genocide, among the most significant of which were
the following:
 the villages of the black Africans were attacked and destroyed, while nearby
Arab villages were not;
 a large number of men were killed, while a large number of women were raped;
 the means to existence, such as livestock and water, were, respectively, killed
and polluted; and
 the GoS prevented both medical care (and medicine) as well as humanitarian
assistance from being delivered to the internally displaced persons camps,
where people were dying from a lack of food, water, and medical attention.14
Ultimately, Powell, Prosper, and the other State Department personnel involved in
the determination ‘‘concluded that there was a deliberate targeting of the groups with
the intent to destroy.’’15 Speaking about the latter, Prosper stated that while
examining and discussing the concepts of unlawful killing and the causing of serious
bodily and mental harm, any of which constitutes an act of genocide under the UNCG,
the real one that got us . . . was the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to
destroy the group in whole, or in part. . . . [With respect to the situation in the IDP
camps, Prosper and Powell could not find any] logical explanation for why the Sudan
government was preventing humanitarian assistance and medicine [into the camps]
other than to destroy the group.16
Kostas notes that ‘‘the government of Sudan was seen as offering unbelievable excuses,
leading Powell to conclude that there was a clearly intentional effort to destroy the
people in the camps who were known to be almost exclusively black African.’’17
Finally, and tellingly,
Prosper’s experience as a prosecutor supported his understanding that genocidal intent
could be inferred from the evidence as well as proved by express statements. As Prosper
explains, Powell and he asked each other if the government of Sudan was not
committing genocide then ‘‘What else are they trying to do?’’ ‘‘What else could their
intent be but to destroy this group?’’ First, Powell and Prosper looked at the
coordination and collaboration between the government of Sudan and the Jinjaweid.
Then, Powell and Prosper examined how the government acted once they were shown to
have knowledge of the perpetrators of violence, the targeting of black African tribes,
and the scale of human destruction in Darfur. This part was most convincing: The
government of Sudan ‘‘had knowledge across the board. Let’s pretend that it wasn’t
coordinated. They knew what was going on and not only did they do nothing to stop it,
they intentionally obstructed assistance that would have bettered the situation. So
when you have knowledge, you take no steps to stop it, and then when people are trying
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to help you block the assistance, what else could you want other than for these people to
die or to be destroyed?’’18
On 9 September 2004, in testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that, ‘‘based on a consistent and
widespread pattern of atrocities (killings, rapes, the burning of villages) committed by
the Janjaweed and government forces against non-Arab villagers,’’ the State
Department had concluded that ‘‘genocide has been committed in Darfur and that
the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility—and genocide may
still be occurring.’’19 Continuing, Powell stated that
 the United States was continuing to press the GoS to rein in the Janjaweed and
that the GoS needed to ‘‘stop being complicit in such raids’’;20
 the United States continued to strongly support the work of the AU monitoring
mission in Darfur, and, in fact, ‘‘initiated the Mission through base camp set-up
and logistics support by a private contractor’’;21 and
 the United States had also called for an ‘‘expanded AU mission in Darfur
through the provision of additional observers and protection forces’’ and
‘‘identified $20.5 million in FY04 funds for initial support of this expanded
mission.’’22
Then, acting under Article VIII of the UNCG,23 Powell reported that the United
States was calling on the United Nations to initiate a full investigation into the
situation in Darfur. In doing so, he said, ‘‘We believe in order to confirm the true
nature, scope and totality of the crimes our evidence reveals, a full-blown and
unfettered investigation needs to occur.’’24
Finally, Powell concluded his statement with these words:
Mr. Chairman, some seem to have been waiting for this determination of genocide to
take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by this determination (emphasis
added). We have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese government to act
responsibly. So, let us not be preoccupied with this designation of genocide. These
people are in desperate need and we must help them.25
Strengths and Limitations of the Investigation, the Genocide Finding,
and Action Based upon the Genocide Finding
The strengths of the ADP were many. More specifically, a methodologically sound
study resulted from the thought, effort, and expertise put into the development of the
questionnaire and the way the investigation was carried out. As part of the
methodology, every one of the twenty-four investigators asked the same set of
questions listed on the questionnaire and documented the findings using the same
coding methods. The number of interviews conducted was large enough to result in
statistically significant findings. Also, ‘‘the final data set used for the Documenting
Atrocities in Darfur report represented three successive waves of data entry.’’26 More
specifically, as Jonathan Howard, an analyst with the US Department of State’s Office
of Research, reports,
As successive teams of interviewers rotated through Chad, the Office of Research hired
an international public opinion research company to create a data set from the
remaining questionnaires. [T]he company’s team of professional coders read each
questionnaire thoroughly, verifying and correcting if necessary the interviewer’s field
codes. In all three rounds of data entry, a fifth of the questionnaires were randomly
selected and recorded by an additional analyst to ensure accuracy in the coding process.
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Each questionnaire’s demographic information, event codes and attendant information
were entered into the data set. Every questionnaire was entered by two different data
entry specialists, or double-punched, to verify that the correct information had been
entered. Once the two data entry specialists separately entered the data from a
questionnaire, a computer compared the two and flagged any discrepancies.
From the final data set, two databases were created. The first was the respondent
database, in which each line of data represents an individual refugee with all related
demographics and event codes for that refugee. 1,136 refugees are represented in the
refugee database. The respondent data set was used to generate the atrocity
percentages in the final report . . .
Because each respondent may have experienced the same event multiple times—
numerous refugees had experienced several attacks during their journey to Chad—
during the analysis stage it was necessary to write a syntax to prevent the statistical
software from counting multiple events towards the total for the survey population . . . .
A second event database was also created in which the multiple events from each
refugee’s story were separated so that each line of data in the event database reported a
single event. 10,304 events are represented in the event database. . . . From the outset,
the team decided to adopt a conservative approach to reporting the data collected
during the documentation mission. To this end, during all three stages of data entry,
events were coded as either eyewitness or hearsay. Eyewitness events were those
reported to have been directly witnessed by the respondent, while hearsay events took
place outside the respondent’s presence. The atrocity statistics eventually reported
reflected only events reported as eyewitnessed by the refugees.27
The efforts of the State Department’s people on the ground in Chad and those involved
in the analysis of the data were seemingly impeccable. Indeed, State’s personnel were
serious, hardworking, dedicated, and demanding. From the outset, they seemed
determined to collect and analyze the data in the most methodologically sound and
accurate manner possible. Furthermore, the study resulted in findings that are
statistically significant.28
Be that as it may, the investigation had certain weaknesses and limitations. First,
the most obvious limitation is that the investigation was conducted solely in Chad,
rather than Darfur and the refugee camps in Chad. Had the ADP been given access to
both those black Africans in IDP camps in Darfur and those who remained in any
villages not destroyed (and, for that matter, to those Arab villagers who were not
attacked but may have witnessed the attacks on the black Africans), the data would
have been much richer. Entry into Darfur for the purpose of an investigation was not,
it seemed, an option—or, at least, not one that the US government wanted to pursue
at the cost of either totally alienating the Sudanese government or being rebuffed.
Second, the respondent pool was largely limited to refugees from the westernmost
states of Darfur, as well as those who, for the most part, had the shortest distance to
travel to Chad. Again, the data would have been richer had the investigators been able
to interview a wider swath of the black African population in Darfur. Third, as the
interviews were being conducted in the first two weeks of the ADP, various
investigators found that they were collecting information about certain categories/
codings not listed on the questionnaire (e.g., questions about disappearances, sexual
violence other than rape, separation by gender, targeting of the elderly, rebel activity
in and/or near the villages). As a result, the coordinators of the ADP passed on such
concerns and suggestions to other investigators spread out along the Chad/Sudan
border. The question that remains is this: Were the other investigators informed
in a timely manner about the additional categories? If not, did the investigators,
of their own accord, add additional categories where they saw fit? If only some
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of the investigators added additional categories, then the information collected in
new categories would be incomplete. That said, the major categories that the
State Department used to make the determination of genocide were included on
the questionnaire every investigator used, and thus the latter concern did not
have much bearing, if any at all, on the final determination of genocide. Finally,
the process of delineating the data on the questionnaires could have been much
more detailed (and uniform) had the investigators been directed to write up the
most detailed narratives possible, as opposed to delineating the findings, as
many did, in an outline format in which they highlighted and, in various cases,
succinctly commented on key points.
According to sources within the US State Department, the final determination of
genocide was arrived at in a methodical and deliberate manner whereby the evidence
gathered during the investigation was compared to the exact wording and concepts
delineated in the UNCG. Be that as it may, numerous scholars have called into
question the motive(s) behind the determination of genocide. Some have not only
questioned these motives but questioned, or attempted to refute, the validity of the
determination.
Prior to highlighting some of the many debates surrounding the motives and
validity of the determination, this author (one of the twenty-four ADP investigators,
and one who believes that the determination of genocide was the correct one to make)
wishes to raise some issues already alluded to in this article. Earlier comments quoted
here indicate that the Bush administration felt pressed to display its concern over
Darfur. For example, as Kostas notes, ‘‘U.S. policy in Sudan was already of special
interest to the Bush administration, and had an important domestic constituency: the
evangelical Christian community. Evangelicals had taken an interest in the plight of
black Christians in southern Sudan and there was a growing left–right coalition on
Darfur.’’29 Furthermore, as Lorne Craner has explained, ‘‘the Bush administration was
eager to point to its leadership on Sudan policy to demonstrate that they could speak
with authority on grave issues of human rights at a time when issues around the
treatment of detainees, particularly at Guanta´namo and Abu Ghraib, threatened to
strip the administration’s voice of legitimacy on human rights issues.’’30 These
comments raise several questions: Was the determination of genocide truly as
‘‘dispassionate and clinical’’ (cum ‘‘apolitical’’) as some within the Bush administration
claim? Was there possibly a bias going into the investigation that genocide would be
found (or, at the least, was there, as strange as this sounds, an ardent hope that it
would be found?), and did that somehow tip the scale in favor of such a determination?
And was there already a plan that, if a genocide determination was made, the White
House would simply pass the matter onto the UN, thus being able to claim, as it did,
that the United States need not do any more than it had already done? At this point,
such questions are simply that: questions; however, they do merit further examination
and study. It should be duly noted that these questions are raised here not to
question the validity of the determination of the genocide but to acknowledge that
there may have been certain factors at work that favored a particular determination—
that is, a certain propensity in favor of making such a determination versus not
doing so.31
A host of other questions also come to mind. In ‘‘A Problem from Hell’’: America
and the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power reports that after being elected and while
reading about the Clinton administration’s failure in Rwanda, George W. Bush ‘‘wrote
in firm letters in the margin of the memo: ‘NOT ON MY WATCH.’’’32 Power goes on to
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comment that ‘‘While he [George W. Bush] was commander in chief, he was saying,
genocide would not recur.’’33 While Bush has obviously reneged on the promise he
made to himself, it is possible that he may have thought that by declaring genocide
(something the Clinton administration failed to do regarding Rwanda—that admin-
istration, in fact, as is well known, even went so far as to warn its officials/bureaucrats
not to use the so-called g-word), his administration was, at least in part, taking the
high road.
Alex de Waal, an expert on the Sudan, has raised two questions about the genocide
determination, and his own responses to each of these questions further complicates
the issue of the possible motive(s) behind that determination:
Is the U.S. government’s determination that the atrocities in Darfur qualify as
‘‘genocide’’ an accurate depiction of the horrors of that war and famine? Or is it the
cynical addition of ‘‘genocide’’ to America’s armoury of hegemonic interventionism—
typically at the expense of the Arabs? The answer is both. The genocide finding is
accurate according to the letter of the law.34 But it is no help to understanding what is
happening in Darfur, or to finding a solution.
And this description merely serves the purposes of a philanthropic alibi to the U.S.
projection of power.35
In addressing the political nature of the determination of genocide, de Waal
asserts that
The 9 September [2004] determination is the first time the Genocide Convention has
been used to diagnose genocide (rather than prosecute it). . . . What does the U.S.
determination signify? At one level, it is the outcome of a very specific set of political
processes in Washington, D.C., in which interest groups were contending for control
over U.S. policy towards Sudan. In this context, the call to set up a State Department
inquiry into whether there was genocide in Darfur was a tactical manoeuvre destined
to placate the anti-Khartoum lobbies circling around Congress (an unlikely alliance of
liberal journalists and human rights advocates, and the religious right), while buying
time for those in the State Department committed to pushing a negotiated
settlement. . . . 36
But at another level, the genocide determination reveals much about the U.S. role in
the world today, and the unstated principles on which U.S. power is exercised. Those
principles are shared by both the advocates of U.S. global domination and their liberal
critics, and are revealed in the commonest narrative around genocide, which takes the
form of a salvation fairy tale, with the U.S. playing the role of the savior.37
. . . For six decades, Americans have been dreaming of redeeming that historic fatal
tardiness, and dispatching troops in time to save the day. Their failure to do so in
Rwanda and Bosnia ten years ago sparked another round of soul searching and led
directly to the Kosovo bombing campaign and the Darfur genocide determination.38
De Waal’s criticism that the 9 September determination was the first time the
UNCG had been used to diagnose genocide, rather than to prosecute it, is, to my mind,
misplaced. Indeed, it seems to me that using the UNCG for the purpose of diagnosing
genocide should, at least when done seriously and conscientiously, be praised rather
than criticized. (Furthermore, the findings of the ADP led the United States to refer
the matter to the United Nations, and the latter, following its own investigation,
referred the matter to the International Criminal Court. As a result, the ICC is now
conducting an investigation into the atrocities in Darfur for the express purpose of
bringing suspected perpetrators to trial. Thus, in fact, the ADP has contributed to the
current effort to bring the perpetrators to trial.) Indeed, why should the UNCG not be
used to diagnose genocide? If and when it can serve that purpose, then it should do so.
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Too often scholars, political analysts, activists, politicians, and the media posit guesses
(some of them wild) as to whether or not a crisis constitutes genocide, and that is
problematic. Is it not better to gather solid data—granted, preferably early on, and
certainly much earlier than the United States did vis-a`-vis Darfur—prior to making a
determination? This is not to say that the international community should wait until
a genocide determination is made to act to halt mass killing. Indeed, whenever any
threat or actual outbreak of mass killing takes place, then strong, effective measures
should be taken to halt it immediately. Surely, however, an accurate determination is
preferable to guesswork.
As for de Waal’s point that the pressure to establish a State Department
investigation was ‘‘a tactical manoeuvre destined to placate the anti-Khartoum lobbies
circling around Congress . . . while buying time for those in the State Department
committed to pushing a negotiated settlement,’’ a question that comes to mind is, What
is the evidence for such an assertion? If, though, even for the sake of argument, one
assumes de Waal is correct, then a further question arises: Just how significant is his
point? First, it is almost a given that most countries will attempt to negotiate a
settlement before resorting to military means. And, generally, this is a good idea. That
said, negotiating with actors that are intransigent and not likely to negotiate in good
faith is not only a waste of time but unconscionable when large numbers of people are
being killed during the negotiation process. As we now know, the ongoing attempt to
negotiate with both the GoS and the rebel groups has largely proved fruitless.
Furthermore, it quickly became apparent that ‘‘talk’’ by the international community
served, once again, as a substitute for action, and at the same time the killing and the
dying (as a result of both murder and genocide by attrition) in Darfur continued
unabated. That was, and is, unconscionable. It seems that a better target for de Waal’s
criticisms would have been the incessant talk carried out by the international
community, rather than the implementation of the ADP.39
Undoubtedly, intervention to halt the killing would have been preferable (at least
to some) to the ongoing negotiations that got nowhere but that was not in the cards for
the United States, in light of its ongoing ‘‘war against terrorism’’ in Afghanistan and
Iraq. That is, it is dubious that the Pentagon would readily—or, for that matter,
begrudgingly—have agreed to send troops into another potential quagmire, especially
when the armed services were already having difficulty recruiting enough personnel
for the war in Iraq. Over and above this fact, the so-called Somalia Factor still haunts
many within the US government.40 Finally, some prognosticators have also ventured
that, in light of the US–Sudanese collaboration on the ‘‘war on terror,’’ the Bush
Administration would not countenance an intervention that would put such
cooperation at risk.
If de Waal is correct that the ADP was used as a ploy to stave off criticism while
focusing on negotiations, it is also true that governments are not known for acting in
the most altruistic manner possible. It is also a fact that governments act for a
multiplicity of motives, some more—and some less—altruistic than others. Also, except
in totalitarian states, governments are not monolithic entities, and some branches or
departments may address issues and make decisions that are not necessarily shared
by, or in accord with, other branches or departments. Aside from all is it so grievous if
the ADP was initiated under pressure, and not for the best of reasons? Is that any
reason to dismiss an investigation that was handled in a highly professional manner
and resulted in a methodologically sound analysis? At the very least, the United States
was doing something besides talking.41
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Another possible motive behind the ADP, which de Waal does not take into
consideration, was the fact that sanctions had been threatened time and again by the
UN but were never carried out, and thus they soon became little more than ‘‘paper
tigers.’’ This continued to happen even when the United States introduced resolutions
aimed at Sudan only to have them watered down by various members of the UN
Security Council, purportedly to avoid ‘‘upsetting Khartoum.’’ The point is that it is
just as likely that the US carried out the ADP, as Craner suggests,42 in the hope of
moving the international community to action. If so, this could hardly be construed as
a questionable or despicable aim.
De Waal is undoubtedly correct that the Darfur crisis did release, as he says,
‘‘another round of soul searching.’’ But is that necessarily bad? I would submit that it is
not. Would de Waal, one wonders, prefer the opposite reaction?
Granted, some critics of the ADP have inferred that the ADP was largely a
cosmetic action—something fairly innocuous in the place of real action.43 This is
possible. But, then, who would have thought that a finding of genocide would
constitute an innocuous action? Certainly not such actors as Natsios and Craner, the
two prime movers behind the ADP. Still, the fact is that, sadly, in many ways—and
particularly in light of the lack of action by the United States to truly push the
international community to halt the killing and death—the assertion that it was
largely cosmetic is difficult (if not impossible) to refute. Again, the only saving grace is
that the finding of the ADP has led to the ICC’s current attempt to bring the
perpetrators to trial. Be that as it may, that has done virtually nothing to protect the
victims of the GoS and the Janjaweed over the past year and a half.
De Waal’s assertion that the United States conducted the investigation in order to
enact a ‘‘salvation fairy tale’’ so that it could play ‘‘the role of the saviour’’ is, at least
in one sense, so outlandish as to be utterly absurd.44 Possibly many at the State
Department and some within the executive branch felt that the investigation
constituted a kind of salvation affair, but in the long run no one, it seems, including
Powell and Bush, could conclude that the United States, in any way whatsoever,
played the role of savior—and that is true for the simple but profound reason that the
United States did the very minimum it could to prevent the killing and rape of the
black Africans of Darfur. The minimum this side of doing nothing, that is.
De Waal sees the determination of genocide as even more problematic than the
motive(s) behind the investigation, and this is because, as he puts it, ‘‘the fact that the
group labelled as genocidaire in this [the Darfur] conflict are ‘Arab’ is no accident.’’45
More specifically, he asserts that
There’s no covert masterplan in Washington to brand Arabs genocidal criminals, but
rather an aggregation of circumstance that has led to the genocide determination. It has
special saliency in the shadow of the U.S. ‘‘global war on terror,’’ misdirected into the
occupation of Iraq and seen across the Arab and Muslim worlds as a reborn political
Orientalism.46
After 11 September 2001, the U.S. sees Muslim Arabs as actual or potential terrorists
targeting the homeland. After 9 September 2004 . . . Arabs (and perhaps all Muslims too)
are actual or potential genocidaires, and their targets are Africans. It’s sad but
predicable that too many Africans will fall for this trap and that the brave efforts of the
African Union to build a continental architecture for peace and security will be impaled
on an externally constructed divide.47
The latter argument is likely to attract considerable debate. One must, at the
least, question the validity of his assertion and argument in light of the fact that
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the Bush administration has reached out to the GoS, an Arab-run government, for help
in its fight against terrorism. More specifically, in May 2005, the CIA flew Salah Gosh,
head of Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Service, to CIA headquarters in
Langley to confer with top CIA administrators. At the time, the CIA must have known
that Gosh was enmeshed in the Darfur crisis and was likely issuing directives to GoS
troops and the Janjaweed.48 The point is that to paint the United States with such
large swaths of opprobrium is somewhat misdirected—and, some would no doubt
claim, sorely so.
It must also be pointed out, however, that the relationship between the United
States and Sudan in the so-called war on terror raises the very real issue of just how
much pressure the United States is really willing to place on the Sudanese
government. Desperate for allies on the anti-terrorism front, the United States is
highly unlikely to risk losing out on major assistance in the area of intelligence
gathering, especially in an area as ‘‘fecund’’ as Sudan.
Howard Adelman, a philosophy professor who has written extensively about
genocide and issues of intervention, is another who vehemently disagrees with the US
determination of genocide and has also raised a host of questions regarding the
motives of the United States. Among some of the many questions he has raised are
these: ‘‘What influence did the desire not to repeat American inaction on Rwanda have
on characterizing Darfur as genocide?’’, ‘‘What was the influence of the Christian lobby
on the resolutions?’’, and ‘‘What was the influence of the immanence [sic] of the 2004
election?’’49
There is no point in repeating the discussion above as to whether the United States
had honorable or ulterior motives in carrying out the investigation. As for Adelman’s
criticism of the determination, he cites all the actors who were and are in disagreement
with it (e.g., the United Nations, the European Union, Doctors without Borders) and
asserts that the atrocities and other actions constitute, at worst, crimes against
humanity. Over-reliance on the UN Commission of Inquiry’s findings, however, seem
ill advised.50
As for Doctors without Borders, Adelman asserts that such a reputable group,
whose leader called for an intervention early on during the 1994 Rwandan genocide
and whose personnel have been on the ground for extended periods in Darfur, should
be duly recognized when it claims that genocide has not been perpetrated in Darfur.
But that is dubious advice for numerous reasons. First, Doctors without Borders has
never conducted its own investigation to ascertain whether or not the crisis in Darfur
constituted genocide. Second, Doctors without Borders did not provide empirical, let
alone conclusive, evidence to support its pronouncement. Third, Adelman has a
relatively close relationship with the African Union and has previously asserted that
he believes calling for an international intervention undermines the will and efforts of
that organization. Ultimately, only he can know how his association with the African
Union affects his stance on how to categorize the atrocities and deaths in Darfur.
One of the fiercest critics of the determination of genocide by Powell and Bush was
(and continues to be) Professor Eric Reeves of Smith College in Northampton,
Massachusetts. In fact, Reeves agrees with the determination; his caustic criticism is
the result of the lack of action that has followed. In a piece entitled ‘‘Secretary of State
Colin Powell’s Genocide Determination: What It Does, and Doesn’t, Mean for Darfur,’’
Reeves asserts that ‘‘by arguing in yesterday’s testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the obligation to ‘prevent’ genocide entails so very little,
Powell has done what his State Department spokesmen have done for months; he has
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made it less likely that the Genocide Convention will ever be used as a tool to serve the
primary purpose for which it was created.’’51 Continuing, Reeves argues that
Powell’s genocide determination may actually signal the end of the Genocide
Convention as a tool of deterrence and prevention. For if a finding of this sort,
rendered in light of the most conspicuous evidence of ongoing genocide, prompts no
action, then the precedent created during yesterday’s Senate testimony by the US
Secretary of State is wholly unfortunate.
The insistence that, despite a genocide finding, ‘‘no new action is dictated’’ reflects in
part US impotence at the UN, a function in many ways of diplomatic capital expended
on the war in Iraq. Indeed, under questioning by Senators on the Foreign Relations
Committee, it became painfully clear that the new US draft resolution being circulated
at the UN Security Council is not so much a draft as a plea. The purposed resolution is
vague, without a clear or explicit threat of sanctions, and establishes no meaningful
new benchmarks for Khartoum.52
This provides a certain ghastly clarity in the new world of the 21st century: even
genocide, even the crime that defined the actions in Rwanda and Eastern Europe
during the Holocaust, does not entail any special response or effort of prevention. If this
indeed marks the end of any particular obligations under the Genocide Convention, we
may legitimately wonder whether the price paid for Powell’s determination is not
exorbitantly high.53
Reeves is certainly justified in his disappointment in and criticism of the US assertion
that it had done all it could do for the targeted population in Darfur and its subsequent
lack of action following the determination. Indeed, once the US government declared
that Sudan had committed genocide, the United States, aside from providing hundreds
of millions of dollars, did the minimum it could (i.e., referring the matter to the UN
Security Council) without totally losing face. Furthermore, its justification that it had
done everything it could do was not only disingenuous but a brazen lie. Be that as it
may, Reeves’s assertion that Powell, and thus the United States, had ‘‘made it less
likely that the Genocide Convention will ever be used as a tool to serve the primary
purpose for which it was created’’ is, or so it seems, nothing short of hyperbole. Of
course, only time will tell if Reeves is correct, but ‘‘ever’’ is a long time. Even if the
international community takes another hundred years or more to act in good faith
when it comes to genocide and make effective use of the UNCG to prevent or halt
genocide, then all will not have been for naught—and it will ‘‘prove’’ that Reeves’s
statement is, in fact, hyperbole. Nevertheless, one can certainly empathize with his
sense of utter disappointment and share his dismay at the disastrous impact that the
United States’ timid and unconscionable response not only will have on the black
Africans of Darfur but is likely to have on the wide range of other groups that will,
inevitably, face major human rights violations, including crimes against humanity and
genocide, in the near and the distant future.
As for Reeves’s criticism of Powell’s assertion that ‘‘no new action is dictated,’’
Powell, of course, was talking about any action by the United States. Legally, Powell
was absolutely correct. Be that as it may, many are bound to find Powell’s, and the
United States’, position morally questionable, at best. Others are likely to counter that
preventing and/or halting genocide should be a shared responsibility and not
something to be left to a single nation, no matter how powerful. Still, when all is
said and done—and not even taking into consideration the possibility of unilateral
intervention—Reeves is correct in asserting that the United States could have done far
more than it did.
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Reeves is also highly critical of the lack of ‘‘teeth’’ in the resolution that the United
States submitted to the UN Security Council. As Reeves puts it, ‘‘What is most striking
about Powell’s testimony concerning the proposed US resolution for the Security
Council is its utter lack of enforcement provisions.’’54 One can hardly argue with
Reeves’s grievance, and I see no point in doing so. Again, the ‘‘actions’’ (or lack thereof)
following the genocide finding left a lot to be desired, and that is a major
understatement. And, in the past year and a half since the declaration, such lack of
action is what has caused the greatest consternation among critics of the US
government’s approach to Darfur.
Finally, Reeves blasts the US government for its tardy response to the
ongoing crisis:
Powell . . . attempt[s] to suggest that the State Department responded in a timely
fashion to the threat of genocide. This is not true. Ample evidence was available at the
end of 2003, clearly suggesting that genocide was occurring (by December 2003 the
nature of the fall offensive by Khartoum and the Janjaweed became fully evident).
Human rights reports, alluded to at one point in Powell’s testimony, were filled with
details suggesting that genocide was unfolding. Certainly by February of 2004, as
attacks on the African tribal populations of Darfur again dramatically increased, there
was more than enough evidence to justify a genocide investigation. And yet the State
Department deployed an investigative team only in July, almost half a year later. This
was shamefully belated action—shamefully.55
Reeves’s criticism is both fair and justified. The investigation could—and should—
have taken place earlier. A government truly dedicated to genocide prevention would
have seen to that. That said, to bring to fruition such an investigation is not within the
purview of any single individual within a government, and thus it takes considerable
time to move such an idea through the necessary channels. One must also take into
account the fact that there was a lot of infighting within the Department of State over
Darfur, and it no doubt took a great deal of effort and time to overcome objections to
such an investigation. This is not, in any way whatsoever, to condone the tardiness of
the investigation, but simply to acknowledge the reality of how governments work.
Such a reality underscores the need to establish a strong anti-genocide regime that is
buffeted as little as possible by partisan politics and realpolitik. Currently, however,
that is solely a goal and dream of genocide scholars and many human rights activists—
and, skeptics, of course, might venture that it is little more than a utopian idea. Again,
time will tell.
Ge´rard Prunier, an expert on East Africa, the Horn, Sudan, and the Great Lakes
of Africa and the author of Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, has also weighed
in on the motives of the investigation, the genocide determination, and the
aftermath of the latter. With respect to the motive(s) behind the investigation,
Prunier seems to suggest that the ever-increasing pressure—from constituents,
non-governmental organizations, Congress, and others—for the US government
to act may have prompted Bush to support a ‘‘genocide investigation’’ into the
Darfur crisis:
On 1 June 2004 the members of Congress who sympathized with the SPLA sent
President Bush a list of twenty-three names of Janjaweed supporters, controllers and
commanders who were either members of the GOS or closely linked to it. The message
was clear: do something about these people. President Bush seemed to have been
embarrassed by the implicit demand, all the more because supporters of the anti-
Khartoum legislation tended to be more ‘‘on the left’’ (in so far as this political category
has relevance in US politics) within both parties and within the fairly tight Black
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Caucus. President Bush could not be expected to care too much about ‘‘the left,’’ but
unfortunately for him there was a core group of anti-Khartoum activists at the opposite
end of the political spectrum, from where he drew most of his electoral support. Many
fundamentalist Protestant organizations had rallied to the anti-Khartoum lobby
activated by Nina Shea. Then by mid-2004 vocal Jewish groups such as the
Committee for the Holocaust Memorial [sic] in Washington had joined in the indignant
chorus of protests about Darfur. The President thus found himself under pressure from
an array of public opinion elements too wide to be ignored during an election year. But
since the ‘‘realists’’ in the intelligence community kept insisting that Khartoum was too
important to be harshly treated, these contradictory pressures led the White House to
compromise on all fronts—supporting the Naivasha negotiations, [and] not putting too
much practical pressure on Khartoum but nevertheless passing legislation which could
be used as a sword of Damocles in case of non-compliance . . . 56
Continuing, Prunier drops a bombshell of sorts, especially if the assertion is true:
‘‘This author was assured that Secretary of State Colin Powell had practically been
ordered to use the term ‘‘genocide’’ during [his] high profile 9 September 2004
testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations but that he [had] also been
advised in the same breath that this did not oblige the United States to undertake any
sort of drastic action, such as a military intervention.’’57 Prunier’s source for the latter
assertion is a ‘‘confidential interview with a high-ranking member of the US
administration, [in] Washington [in] October 2004.’’58 It is certainly possible, of
course, that Powell had received a ‘‘push’’ in that direction. Be that as it may, there are
three sticking points in the statement. First, it comes from an unidentified source and
cannot readily be followed up. That, of course, does not mean it is not true, but it does
complicate matters. Second, Prunier uses the words ‘‘practically been ordered.’’
So Powell, ostensibly, was not ordered but was strongly encouraged, pressured,
prodded, or goaded to do so. Third, Prunier uses the word ‘‘advised.’’ Being ‘‘advised,’’
of course, is not the same as being told, directed, or ordered to do something. The
questions that arise from such wording are many, including but not limited to the
following: Was Powell, in fact, ‘‘practically ordered’’ to use the word ‘‘genocide,’’ and did
he cave in to the pressure or act the part of the ‘‘good soldier’’? Or was the analysis of
the data collected by the ADT persuasive ‘‘enough’’ that Powell felt comfortable using
the word ‘‘genocide’’ of his own accord? Or was the analysis of the data persuasive
enough that Powell did not feel guilty using the word ‘‘genocide’’ when all but ordered
to do so? The same sorts of questions, of course, are germane to his statement about the
United States’ not being obligated to do any more than it already had done vis-a`-vis
Darfur.
Prunier concludes by asserting that ‘‘President Bush tried to be all things to all
men on the Sudan/Darfur question. Never mind that the result was predictably
confused. What mattered was that attractive promises could be handed around
without any sort of firm commitment being made. Predictably, the interest level of US
diplomacy on the Sudan question dropped sharply as soon as President Bush was
reelected.’’59 Prunier is certainly correct with respect to his comment about a lack of
‘‘firm commitment’’ being made in the aftermath of the determination. As for US
diplomatic efforts vis-a`-vis Darfur, they have actually waxed and waned time and
again over the course of the past year and a half. There have been spikes of interest
(most recently in pushing for the deployment of UN troops and NATO involvement in
Darfur), but there have also been mixed messages issued by Bush’s underlings in the
State Department (e.g., as to whether the situation in Darfur still constitutes genocide
and whether there is a need to push for tough sanctions on Khartoum and/or prod the
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UN to undertake an intervention). Ultimately, Prunier is correct in suggesting that
‘‘talk’’ over action has been the modus operandi of the Bush administration’s approach
to protecting the black Africans of Darfur.
Ramifications of the ADP
The development and implementation of the ADP, aside from the determination based
on the data collected by its team, has numerous ramifications. So too, of course, does
the genocide determination by the US government. As one might surmise, some are
positive and some are negative.
First, the development and implementation of the ADP set a precedent of sorts in
terms of the way in which an individual nation can develop and conduct an
investigation for the express purpose of attempting to ascertain whether genocide is
being perpetrated in some part of the world. Indeed, it proves that it can be done fairly
quickly, efficiently, and effectively and relatively inexpensively. That, in itself, is
significant, for far too often, in the past, individual nations, the media, human-rights
activists, and the international community have relied more on guesswork and
piecemeal information seeping in from different sources than on carefully collected and
analyzed data to ascertain the nature of a violent conflict.
Second, the precedent has now been established for an individual nation to conduct
an investigation into atrocities while they are being perpetrated for the express
purpose of ascertaining whether genocide has been perpetrated or not. While this may
appear to be of little note, it is nothing of the sort. If nothing else—and this is
significant—there is no excuse for nations with sufficient financial wherewithal to fail
to conduct such investigations when it appears that a situation may be spiraling
toward crimes against humanity or genocide. In other words, a new bar has been set in
making a genocide determination. Now it is up to citizens, human-rights activists,
NGOs, genocide scholars, and others to insist on such investigations.
Third, the ADP has provided a solid model for one essential component of an anti-
genocide regime. Such investigations should become an integral part of any
anti-genocide regime, and, thanks to the ADP, this is not a component that will
need to be developed from scratch. Given that the ADP was not perfect (but what is?),
developers of future investigations can learn from both the strengths and weaknesses
of the ADP.
As for the genocide determination, a precedent has been set in which one sovereign
nation (the United States) has accused another sovereign nation (Sudan) of
committing genocide while the atrocities were still ongoing. This, in itself, was a
historic event and thus significant. That is, the determination broke, if you will, a
certain taboo against individual nations’ making such an accusation when not only
justified in doing so but, if signatories to the UNCG, morally obligated to do so.
Be that as it may—and ironically and sadly—there is also the danger, as numerous
scholars and commentators have asserted, that, in the end, the genocide determination
by the United States could prove counterproductive. More specifically, the fact that the
determination was made and then the matter was simply and solely referred to the UN
Security Council does not bode well for those in favor of a proactive stance against
genocide. Indeed, the fact that the determination did not result in any concrete action
by the United States to attempt to halt the ongoing genocide may, in the short run (but
even here we are talking about throwing into the lurch precious and fragile lives of
untold numbers of people)—if not in the long run—result in minimizing the ‘‘weight’’
and significance of such a finding. That is, other nations and international bodies may
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now perceive such determinations simply a matter of course and of no great
consequence.
As the cliche´ goes, only time will tell. That said, de Waal makes the interesting
point that ‘‘although Colin Powell insisted the U.S. policy towards Sudan would
remain unchanged—thereby seeming to defeat the purpose of making the determina-
tion in the first place—there is no doubt that declaring genocide creates legal and
political space for intervention.’’60 It is still possible, of course, for a military
intervention to take place in Darfur. While most would agree that if an intervention
is eventually carried out it will have been horrifically late in coming, it is crucial to
recognize and appreciate the fact that some 2 million displaced persons are still at the
mercy of the GoS and the Janjaweed and are in need of all the help they can get in
staving off even more terror and mayhem. And if an intervention does take place, then
the genocide determination by the US may well have served the important purpose,
at least in part, of having ‘‘created the legal and political [and one might add, moral]
space’’ for doing so.
Conclusion
Aside from continuing to provide humanitarian aid, which was not, of course,
inconsequential, the only other major action that the United States undertook
following its determination of genocide was to refer the matter to the UN Security
Council. In doing so, it called for a more comprehensive study of the Darfur crisis. At
the time, many scholars and activists raised the issue of whether another study was
really needed, especially in light of the fact that no one—other than Khartoum,
perhaps—doubted that grave crimes against humanity had been perpetrated against
the black Africans in Darfur and that they continued to perish in huge numbers as a
result of the actions of the GoS and Janjaweed.
A question that has been asked by many, though it was largely rhetorical, was,
Did the United States actually do all it could? The answer was, and continues to be, an
emphatic ‘‘No!’’ Among some of the many options that the United States could have
pursued but chose not to—no doubt for reasons of realpolitik—were to push implacably
for a multilateral effort to establish a no-fly zone over Darfur, or do it alone; to apply
unrelenting pressure on the UN Security Council to establish a strong, mandate under
chapter VII of the UN Charter that would allow the AU troops (and others) to truly
protect the black Africans at risk; to apply equally unrelenting pressure on the African
Union to allow UN troops to join the AU forces in Darfur; to provide the AU troops and
recruits with top-notch training prior to their deployment to Darfur; to provide the
AU with ample military materiel and equipment, along with a guarantee of fuel and
personnel to service that equipment, such as four-wheel vehicles, planes, and so on,
instead of providing dribbles of military support; and to serve notice on Khartoum that
if it continued to interfere with or outright block humanitarian aid from reaching the
IDP camps, the repercussions would be serious—and then act on such notice in a
timely and effective manner. Noticeably absent from this list is the possibility of the
United States’ actually sending its own troops to Darfur, whether as a multilateral or a
unilateral effort, supported or not supported by the UN Security Council. Again, as
discussed above, this was never, at least as far as the Bush administration was
concerned, a real option. The point is, however, that there is plenty that the United
States could have done—and still should do—but it has not. And that is nothing short
of shameful.
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The Endless Debate over the ‘G Word’
Major Brent Beardsley
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Royal Military College
of Canada
I am an infantry officer in the Canadian Army of the Canadian Armed Forces.
In 1993–1994, I served as the personal staff officer to then Major-General Rome´o
Dallaire, the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR). As such, I was a witness, a bystander, and an occasional rescuer and
helper to what the Organization of African Unity labeled ‘‘the Preventable Genocide.’’
One of the major reasons the genocide in Rwanda was not prevented or stopped
was the endless debate in April, May, and June 1994, when the majority of attention
and effort was focused on debating whether or not genocide was taking place in
Rwanda instead of on preparing and conducting a multi-disciplinary (including
military) intervention to stop the killing. For days, weeks, and months the discussions
went back and forth between those who labeled the catastrophe a genocide, and
demanded that the international community live up to its obligations under the UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) and
intervene to suppress the genocide, and those who argued that the situation in
Rwanda was not a genocide but ‘‘just gross violations of human rights, crimes against
humanity and war crimes’’ (as if these were acceptable crimes to ignore). The failure to
intervene permitted the genocide to largely run its course, consuming between 500,000
and 1 million innocent men, women, and children.
On too many occasions, especially during the genocide in Rwanda and the current
genocide in Darfur, the organs of the international community have been far more
focused on conducting some form of academic or legal debate over the use of the word
‘‘genocide’’ to describe these catastrophes than on focusing our attention and efforts
toward actually doing something to stop the killing. Never were we more frustrated
and saddened in Rwanda during the genocide than when we were informed on a
Friday that the Security Council had adjourned for the weekend, without decision.
We knew that while the diplomats and bureaucrats would be enjoying the culinary
delights of Manhattan, another 10,000 to 20,000 innocent men, women, and
children would die while the world discussed, debated, contemplated, and, inevitably,
let the genocide run its course. While the determination of genocide is not a matter to
be taken lightly, it must also not become an excuse to procrastinate while thousands
are dying.
As a witness to the events of 1994, I have had to live with the failure of the
international community to identify the catastrophic killings in Rwanda as genocide in
a sufficient matter of time in order to intervene to stop the killing and save Rwandan
lives. I have also had to live with my own role as a member of UNAMIR for our failure,
for my failure, to prevent or stop the genocide. I do not wish to see the same mistake
made again, and, therefore, I appreciate the opportunity the editors of this new
professional journal have given me to presenting this opinion piece on the current
situation in Darfur. I do not claim to be a genocide scholar or an expert in anything
other than my chosen profession, and I do not consider my opinions any more valid
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than others’. I approach this topic with the experience of a witness to a genocide, and a
witness to the failure of humanity to stop the Rwandan genocide; I only wish to offer
some ideas, which I hope will spark a far greater debate among better men and women
than I and a greater effort in developing a more effective response to the ongoing
genocide in Darfur.
In 2004, on the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, leaders from across
the world or their representatives, scholars, activists, and survivors gathered in Kigali,
Rwanda, to commemorate the genocide and lament the failure of humanity and the
international community to prevent or stop it in 1994. The sacred, yet hollow, words
‘‘Never Again’’ were echoed by virtually every speaker, and vague and false assurances
and commitments were made, declaring that such a failure must never happen again.
As too many spoke these shallow words, a few thousand kilometers north of Rwanda,
in the Darfur region of Sudan, the first reports were emerging in the Western media of
a humanitarian catastrophe, clouded in a civil war or counter-insurgency campaign,
which had at that time claimed the lives of at least 30,000 civilians, forced at least
200,000 into exile as refugees, and displaced at least a million inside Darfur. Little,
if anything, was said in Kigali of what was happening in Darfur, and the killings
continued.
Since 2004 we have seen an US-sponsored investigation concluding that genocide
is taking place in Darfur; a United Nations investigation concluding that genocide is
not taking place in Darfur; sporadic, ill-informed media coverage; division within the
diplomatic, non-governmental, and academic communities over the question of
genocide in Darfur; and an endless debate that rapidly deteriorates into legal tail-
chasing and stale academic debates. All the while, Darfurians die, and the response to
date by the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union (AU), and others
has not stopped the killing, which is now conservatively estimated to have claimed the
lives of more than 300,000 people and forcibly displaced over 2 million others. And the
debate continues as people—innocent men, women, and children—die at a rate of
almost 10,000 per month.
Is genocide taking place in Darfur? First, the UNCG states that genocide involves
‘‘the intent to destroy in whole or in part members of a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group as such.’’1 The people of Darfur are black Africans with distinct tribal
and ethnic affiliations, which are recognized as such by the perpetrators and fellow
Darfurians. They, in fact, constitute members of specific ethnic and racial groups.
Second, genocide is committed by ‘‘killing members of the group; causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and/or] forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.’’2 The Janjaweed militia has
murdered tens of thousands of human beings in Darfur; subjected men to execution
and women to gang rape and branding; separated men from women, thus preventing
births; and abducted children, who allegedly are being sold into slavery. In addition, it
has destroyed homes, wells, farms, and crops for the express purpose of making the
area uninhabitable and thus forcing the population into camps within and outside
Sudan. These camps are located in desert areas, with the most extreme weather
conditions, and people must live without access to water, food, firewood, shelter, or
medical support, in conditions of life that are very likely, over time, to result in death.
Each of the above facts, well documented by international, governmental, non-
governmental, and media organizations, is an act of genocide; yet we continue to
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debate endlessly whether or not the ‘‘threshold of intent’’ has been met. When anyone
starts killing people and the death rate rises in two years from zero to 300,000 dead, I
would suggest, common sense should dictate that a genocidal intent is being clearly
demonstrated.
Under the UNCG, the contracting parties ‘‘may call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they
consider appropriate for preventing and suppressing these acts of genocide.’’3
Therefore, if it can be concluded that genocide is taking place in Darfur, then the
international community has a moral obligation to intervene to stop this latest
genocide.
As the current situation in Darfur continues to develop, the catastrophe in the
region has been labeled a genocide by the Bush administration, by numerous genocide
scholars, by large parts of the media, and by non-governmental organizations such as
Genocide Watch. To date, efforts to respond to the genocide have been limited to
ineffectual diplomacy with the Sudanese government in Khartoum; the deployment of
a weakly mandated and inadequately led, trained, equipped, and supported AU
peacekeeping force; and the provision of money, humanitarian aid, and some cast-off
equipment. The international community is slowly coming to the conclusion that
the lack of will and means to respond effectively to the situation in Darfur is
in fact permitting another genocide to unfold on the African continent, regardless
of the pontificating statements of 2004 in Kigali, when all present committed to
‘‘Never Again.’’
What will be required to stop the genocide in Darfur? First, an honest and
common-sense admission that genocide is taking place there. Second, an honest
admission that we, in the international community, especially those of us in the West,
have a moral obligation to intervene to stop that genocide. Third, doing just that:
threatening, while preparing a full humanitarian intervention, and, if the government
of Sudan does not stop the killing in Darfur, actually intervening with the full military
might of the international community to force the government of Sudan to stand down
its armed forces, police, and militia or risk losing some or all of these forces. The armed
forces of Sudan are all that keep the current regime in power. If it were to lose its
military capability, the regime’s survival would be at an end.
The endless debate over the ‘‘G-word’’ and the totally inadequate response to the
genocide in Darfur have not to date stopped, and will not stop, the killing. We should
not be surprised. For forty years, regimes in Khartoum have employed genocide as a
tool in their ethnic, racial, and religious consolidation of power. For twenty years,
African Christians in the south of Sudan were subjected to genocidal violence. In the
1980s, the Dinka people were almost exterminated. In the 1990s, the Nuba people
were almost exterminated in yet another genocide. Successive governments of Sudan,
with virtual immunity, have repeatedly resorted to genocide as a matter of domestic
policy that has claimed the lives of up to 2 million of their citizens.
It is unlikely that the government of Sudan will change its behavior until it
believes that, this time, the international community is serious and recognizes that it
has more to lose than to gain by continuing a policy of genocide in Darfur.
Every problem is not a nail that can be solved by using a hammer. But some
problems are nails that do require the use of a hammer. The genocide in Darfur is such
a situation, and, despite our best efforts—or our worst efforts, or no effort at all—the
situation in Darfur has exponentially worsened. While the debate and deliberations
seem to continue endlessly, Darfurians continue to die each and every day. How many
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must die—500,000? One million? Two or 3 million?—until we in the West with the
means (if not the greatest will) accept our responsibility and obligation to intervene,
and, if necessary, to use the hammer to stop the killings in Darfur? The time for debate
is over. The time to give meaning to the cry ‘‘Never Again’’ is upon us.
Notes
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (accessed 21 April
2006), art. 2.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., art. 8.
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Introduction to the Special Issue on Darfur
Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen
In launching the first issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention, we, the four editors
(Alex Alvarez, Herb Hirsch, Eric Markusen, and Samuel Totten), feel compelled to
address one of the most pressing issues facing genocide scholars today—the current
crisis in Darfur, Sudan. It is a crisis that erupted in early 2003 and continues today.
It is one in which government of Sudan troops (GoS) and the Janjaweed (Arab militia)
are responsible for the mass murder of an estimated 180,000 black Africans (primarily
from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit tribal groups) and possibly more than 250,000
others as a result of genocide by attrition (depriving the more than two million
internally displaced persons of adequate food, water, shelter, and medical care).
Once again—as happened in Rwanda in 1994 and in Srebrenica in 1995, to
mention but two instances—the international community’s response to the unfolding
crisis was late in coming and far too tepid and anemic when it did come. As far back as
December 2003, Jan Egeland, UN undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs,
declared Darfur to be the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, and yet the
international community proffered words over action in ‘‘addressing’’ the crisis. While
various non-governmental organizations decried the situation in Darfur, the UN
Security Council dithered by issuing one timid resolution after another in which it
made idle threats to sanction Sudan if the killing, mass displacement, mass rape, and
destruction continued. The mass murder—some, including the US government,
deemed it genocide, while others, including the UN, deemed it crimes against
humanity—continued unabated, but the United Nations did not see fit to alter its
response in any real way.
Instead of taking firm steps to halt the mass killing, rape, and wholesale
destruction of the black Africans’ villages and their way of life (it is estimated that
more than 2,000 black African villages have been utterly destroyed and burned to the
ground), the UN Security Council welcomed the African Union’s offer to deploy troops
as monitors in the Darfur area. The UN Security Council knew full well that the AU
mission would be not only undermanned and under-resourced but working with an
inadequate mandate, but it did not seem to care about such critical limitations and
liabilities. It is also true that the AU mission ostensibly provided the UN Security
Council with an easy ‘‘out.’’ That is, as long as the African Union was on the ground in
Darfur—and continued to demand that it be allowed to handle the crisis on its own—
the UN Security Council was more than willing to capitulate to these demands, for the
simple but profound reason that this provided the council with a rationale for not
acting. Such an approach also met the specific wishes of at least three of the
permanent members of the Security Council: China (which has huge petroleum
interests in Sudan), Russia (which has a large and extremely lucrative arms deal with
Sudan), and the United States (which now considers Sudan a partner in its so-called
war on terrorism). Once again, realpolitik won out over real humanitarian concern.
This special issue on Darfur provides a glimpse into various aspects of the crisis.
Rene´ Lemarchand, an expert on the Great Lakes region of Africa, contributes an
overview of the crisis that places it within the larger context of Sudan’s history. Scott
Straus, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, presents a
comparative study of the genocides perpetrated in Rwanda (in 1994) and in Darfur.
Samuel Totten, a scholar of genocide studies at the University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville, provides a critique of the US State Department’s Atrocities
Documentation Project—whose data resulted in the determination by the US
government that genocide had been (and possibly continued to be) perpetrated in
Darfur—along with a critique of the motives and ramifications of the ‘‘finding’’ of
genocide. Kelly D. Askin, a lawyer, scholar, and expert on mass rape, delineates and
discusses the crimes that have been perpetrated against girls and women in Darfur
since early 2003. Jerry Fowler, a lawyer and the staff director of the Committee
on Conscience at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, presents an
argument as to why and how, under international law, the situation in Darfur
constitutes genocide. Finally, Canadian military officer Major Brent Beardsley,
who served as personal assistant to the force commander of the United Nations
Mission in Rwanda during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, reflects on the failure of
the international community to stop the genocide in Rwanda and the significance of
the latter vis-a-vis the ongoing tragedy in Darfur.
The aim of this special issue on Darfur is to provide readers with a sense of what is
taking place on the ground in Darfur, the international community’s reaction to the
crisis, and the ramifications of the latter for the people of Darfur, and for efforts to
develop effective means for preventing and/or stanching genocide. In many ways, it is
also a lamentation for lives lost and an expression of frustration and anger over what
could have been but wasn’t, since the international community seems stuck in its
affinity for realpolitik.
Introduction to the Special Issue on Darfur
v
Contributors
Kelly Dawn Askin currently serves as Senior Legal Officer, International Justice,
with the Open Society Justice Initiative. She has also served as an expert consultant,
legal advisor, and international law trainer to prosecutors, judges, and registry at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor, and the
International Criminal Court. Among her publications are War Crimes against
Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals (Transnational
Publishers, 1997) and the three-volume treatise Women and International Human
Rights Law (Transnational Publishers, 1999, 2001, 2002), of which she is co-editor.
Askin be reached at kaskin@justiceinitaitive.org.
Major Brent Beardsley has served for twenty-six years as an Infantry Officer in the
Royal Canadian Regiment. In 1993–1994, he served as General Rome´o Dallaire’s
personal staff officer in UNAMIR, before and during the genocide in Rwanda; he is the
co-author of General Dallaire’s memoir Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure
of Humanity in Rwanda (Random House Canada, 2004). He is currently serving
as a research officer at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute at the Canadian
Defence Academy. He is also completing a master of arts degree in War Studies
at the Royal Military College of Canada, where the focus of his studies is on
genocide and humanitarian intervention. Major Beardsley can be contacted at
brent.beardsley@rmc.ca.
Jerry Fowler is staff director of the Committee on Conscience, which guides the
genocide prevention efforts of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. He is a
graduate of Princeton University and has a law degree from Stanford University. He
has taught at George Mason University Law School and at George Washington
University. His publications include ‘‘Out of That Darkness: Preventing Genocide in
the 21st Century,’’ in Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views
(Routledge, 2004). Fowler can be reached at jfowler@ushmm.org.
Rene´ Lemarchand is professor emeritus of political science at the University of
Florida (Gainesville). He has written extensively on Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo.
His book Rwanda and Burundi (Praeger, 1970) received the Melville Herskovits
Award of the African Studies Association in 1970. He served as Regional Advisor on
Governance and Democracy with USAID from 1993 to 1998, first in Abidjan and then
in Accra. He has been visiting professor at Smith College, Brown University, the
University of Copenhagen, the University of Bordeaux, and the University of
California, Berkeley. Lemarchand can be reached at renelemar@aol.com.
Eric Markusen (MSW, University of Washington; PhD, University of Minnesota) is
Professor of Sociology and Social Work at Southwest Minnesota State University and a
senior researcher with the Department of Holocaust and Genocide Studies of the
Danish Institute for International Studies. He has written about nuclear weapons
policy; the nature of modern war; the Holocaust; and the genocides in Cambodia,
Contributors. Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, 1 (July 2006): 89–90.  2006 Genocide Studies
and Prevention.
Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan. Markusen served as an investigator on the US
government’s Atrocities Documentation Team, interviewing refugees from the
genocide in Darfur. Markusen can be reached at markusen@southwestmsu.edu
Scott Straus is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at
the University of Wisconsin. He is the author of two forthcoming books on Rwanda:
The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Cornell University Press)
and, with Robert Lyons, Intimate Enemy: Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide
(Zone Books). He has also published articles in Foreign Affairs, the Journal of Genocide
Research, and Patterns of Prejudice. Straus can be reached at sstraus@wisc.edu.
Samuel Totten, a scholar of genocide studies, is based at the University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville. Totten was one of the twenty-four investigators on the US Department of
State’s Darfur Atrocities Documentation Team, whose express purpose was to collect
data to enable the US government to ascertain whether genocide or not had been
perpetrated in Darfur. Among the books Totten has most recently edited, co-edited, or
written on genocide are Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts
(Routledge, 2004); Genocide at the Millennium (Transaction Publishers, 2004); and
The Prevention and Intervention of Genocide: An Annotated Bibliography (Routledge,
2006). Totten can be reached at stotten@uark.edu.
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:1 July 2006
90
